University of Miami Law School

University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles

Faculty and Deans

2003

Retrying Race
Anthony V. Alfieri
University of Miami School of Law, aalfieri@law.miami.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law and Society
Commons
Recommended Citation
Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1141 (2003).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

RETRYING RACE
Anthony V. Alfieri*

INTRODUCTION

This Essay investigates the renewed prosecution of long-dormant
criminal and civil rights cases of white-on-black racial violence arising
out of the 1950s and 1960s. The study is part of an ongoing project on
race, lawyers, and ethics within the criminal-justice system., Framed
by this larger project, the Essay explores the normative and sociolegal
meaning of that resurgent prosecution. My hope in pursuing this
inquiry is to better understand, and perhaps begin to refashion, the
prosecutor's redemptive role in cases of racial violence.2
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of
Miami School of Law. A.B. 1981, Brown University; J.D. 1984, Columbia University School
of Law. - Ed. I am grateful to Adrian Barker, Richard Delgado, John Ely, Michael Fischl,
Ellen Grant, Patrick Gudridge, Amelia Hope, Don Jones, Cynthia McKenzie, Martha
Minow, Harriet Roberts, Peggy Russell, Jonathan Simon, Karen Throckmorton, Frank Valdes, and Eric Yamamoto for their comments and support.
I also wish to thank Javier Avino, Wendy Blasius, David Birke, Chauncey Kelly, Lauren
Luis, Claudine Rigaud, Nathaniel Tobin, and the University of Miami School of Law library
staff for their research assistance, as well as Nadia Shihata and the editors of the Michigan
Law Review for their devotion.
This Essay mourns for my father, John B. Alfieri, no one to drive the car.
1. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995) (exploring the rhetoric of race in cases of black-on-white racially motivated violence; citing the
defense of Damian Williams and Henry Watson on charges of beating Reginald Denny and
others during the 1992 South Central Los Angeles riots); Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics:
Towarda Theory of RacializedDefenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997) (probing racial rhetoric
in cases of white-on-black racially incited violence; noting the civil and criminal trial of the
Ku Klux Klan in the 1981 lynching of Michael Donald); Anthony V. Alfieri, ProsecutingRace,
48 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1999) (examining the federal prosecution of five white New York City police
officers charged with assaulting Abner Louima, a young male Haitian immigrant, in 1997);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809
(2000) [hereinafter Alfieri, Prosecuting ViolenceReconstructing Community] (discussing the
1990-91 Central Park Jogger sexual assault trials in New York City and the 1998-99 James Byrd
capital murder trials in Jasper, Texas); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors,Race Defenders, 89
GEO. L.J. 2228 (2001) (assembling "race-conscious, community regarding methods of representation culled from conventional and alternative models of criminal prosecution and defense");
Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1293 (1998) [hereinafter Alfieri, Race Trials]
(analyzing the rhetorical meaning of race in the federal and state trials of Lemrick Nelson,
which grew out of four days of interracial violence in the Crown Heights section of Brooklyn, New York, in 1991).
2. Prior efforts in this enterprise to reconstruct prosecutor and defender roles have
sparked criticism. See, e.g., Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives:
Discovering the Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788 (1996); Richard Delgado,
Making Pets: Social Workers, "Problem Groups," and the Role of the SPCA - Getting a Little More Precise About Racialized Narratives, 77 TEXAs L. REV. 1571 (1999); Christopher
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Both descriptive and prescriptive in nature, the inquiry addresses
race in relation to law and community.' Grappling with the historical
violence accompanying that troubled relationship, the Essay employs
the notion of race cases to decipher juridical forms of white-on-black
violence, parsing their content and tracing their genealogy in selected
criminal and civil rights prosecutions of the 1950s and 1960s.1 The
central purpose of this inquiry is to ground the justification for retrying race cases in the discretionary ethics of the prosecution function
and the normative jurisprudence of criminal justice.
Race cases present hard and easy judgments of prosecutorial
discretion. The threshold justification for retrying race cases comes
from the standard conception of discretion and its adversary systembased sources of normative guidance. Under standard discretion, easy
cases for retrial emerge from supervening events material to the
outcome of prior prosecutions, such as the discovery of new physical
evidence, the identification of new witnesses, and the belated proffer
of inculpating confessions. Hard cases, by comparison, resurface on
their own strength of merit without the benefit of supervening events.
In such cases, prosecutors adduce no new evidence, produce no new
witnesses, and offer no startling "deathbed" confessions. Instead, they
grasp the elusive opportunity to right historical wrongs committed in
aborted or failed criminal and civil rights prosecutions.
Standard discretion permits prosecutors to seize the opportunity to
renew aborted and correct failed race case proceedings. The seizure of
prosecutorial power, however well-intentioned, is distinct from the
reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion. To be sure, power is the
necessary precondition of discretion. Yet, power alone is insufficient
to give reasoned justification for reopening long-dormant cases.
Indeed, if the reopening of race cases turned solely on evenhandedprosecutorial power, then black victims would not have been made to
suffer decades of irrevocable loss and white lawbreakers would not
have enjoyed the freedom of lasting immunity.
The hazard of extending the inquiry of reopening beyond the
bluntness of curative power is both theoretical and practical. Power
infects law and society.5 It adopts manifold public and private forms.

Slobogin, Race-Based Defenses - The Insights of TraditionalAnalysis, 54 ARK. L. REV. 739
(2002); Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1585 (1999). But see Alex J. Hurder, The Pursuit of Justice: New
Directionsin ScholarshipAbout the Practiceof Law, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167,185-86 (2002).
3. For an elegant account of the intersection of law and community, see AVIAM SOIFER,
LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995).
4. See infra Section H.A.
5. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books ed. 1979) (1975); JUSTICE AND POWER IN
SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998); Jonathan Simon,
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And it finds expression in myriad state, institutional, and individual
actions. Allied with race, it distorts lawyer cognition and epistemology, and deforms sociolegal discourse and ideology. The upshot of
that alliance is displayed in the decades of prosecutorial inaction toward reopening race cases.
The clandestine alliance of race and power endangers efforts to
explicate and justify reopening under the ethical and jurisprudential
norms of criminal justice. Inside the criminal-justice system, race and
power seem veiled, furtively encircling prosecutors and fouling their
professional judgment. Ensnared by race-embedded tradition,
prosecutors seem inured to ethical or jurisprudential calls for reopening. And yet, drawing on the tenets of liberal legalism, the criminaljustice system concedes not only a measure of
independence to
6
prosecutors, but also a degree of autonomy to law.
Predicated on liberal legalism, the call for reopening echoes the
precepts of lawyer independence and the autonomy of law. Like
power, however, these precepts mix with race to constrain prosecutor
independence and jurisprudential autonomy. The constraint rises from
color and the foundational commitment to a colorblind jurisprudence.
Unsurprisingly, the jurisprudence of a colorblind faith in criminaljustice prosecutions in part explains the reopening of dormant race
cases. As to black victims and white offenders, that faith dictates
equality of treatment, for example, in the submission of new evidence.
But that explanation applies only to easy cases of newly discovered
evidence. It fails to explain the delay in reopening hard cases, where
prosecutorial judgment is solely at stake.
The genesis of a colorblind commitment to criminal justice extends
far into American legal history. Colorblind claims propound a prosecutorial stance of neutrality toward race and race cases. For prosecutors occupying this stance and contemplating reopening criminal and
civil rights cases, race is inapposite. But for divergences of fact or law,
like cases are to be treated alike in context and in retrospect.
The aesthetics and mechanics of colorblind prosecution offer an
appealing formalism. As a model of legal process, prosecutorial
formalism carries integrity and efficiency. Yet, when applied to dormant race cases, it lacks an explanation and a justification for historical delay. Putting aside lawyer error or misconduct, colorblind prosecutors cannot account for either delay or failure in reopening past
prosecutions, except to cite extra-judicial sources of interference, such
as jury nullification, police corruption or witness intimidation.

Between Power and Knowledge: Habermas, Foucault, and the Future of Legal Studies, 28
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 947 (1994).
6. See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 219-69

(1975).
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The contemporary legacy of colorblind prosecution is color-coded
pretext. Driven by mixed motives, the twin desires to stand presently
unbiased and rectify past injustice, color-coded claims maintain a
disinterested stance while surreptitiously evoking, and often exploiting, racial status and stereotypes. Posed as dispassionate and objective,
color-coded prosecutions impart a familiar instrumentalism. Unlike a
formalist model of legal process, instrumentalism is purposive and
result-oriented. As a model, however, it lacks candor and risks unfairness to both victim and offender. Despite a lack of transparency and
the risk of unfairness, color-coded prosecutions supply a legitimate
justification for reopening race cases. Outcome-orientation notwithstanding, color-coded-driven reopenings advance dignity and equality
norms on behalf of the victim and the state. Reopening affirms the
dignity and worth of the victim as an inviolate person. At the same
time, it vindicates the state interest in the equal protection of criminal
and civil rights laws. That normative advancement sacrifices the
process values of candor, openness, and fairness.
The normative costs of color-coded prosecutions leave raceconscious discretion as an alternative justification for reopening
abandoned race cases. Race-conscious discretion posits color as a key
constituent of sociolegal roles, relationships, and institutions. Sensitive
to the starkness of and gradations in color, race-conscious prosecutors
survey white offenders, black victims, and their assembled public and
private communities for signs of color consciousness. In this way, they
seek to reincorporate community into the prosecution function and
the criminal-justice process. Under race-conscious discretion, color
connects private lawbreaking and public responsibility. Admitting
collective responsibility and demonstrating contrition within whiteoffender communities and embracing the obligations of forgiveness
and showing mercy within black-victim communities link restorative
justice imperatives to the exercise of race-conscious discretion. That
linkage introduces a redemptive role for prosecutors in retrying cases
of racial violence.
Redemption-spurred restorative discretion in race cases is colorconscious. Discarding the pretense of colorblind claims and the pretext of color-coded contentions, restorative discretion urges candor in
recollecting local histories of racial violence and in reconciling painful
differences of cross-racial community. Candor is tied to an open call
for offender atonement and victim mercy. That call fastens retributive
theories of punishment to redemption and reconciliation norms,
integrating offender contrition and victim forgiveness while mitigating
vengeance. Stitching retributive and restorative theories of punishment into a race-conscious model of lawyer discretion furnishes a
redemptive process for prosecutors sullied by decades-old failure and
decades-long neglect of criminal and civil rights cases. Redemption
requires the reconception of victim, offender, and community identity,
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the translation of their private segregated narratives into public
empathic dialogues, and the revision of prosecutorial norms and practices to engender cross-racial conversations and restorative collaborations.
To muster a redemptive appraisal of prosecutorial norms and practices in retrying cases of white-on-black violence, the Essay will be
divided into five parts. Part I examines the place of race in law and
community. Part II outlines a genealogy of race cases and describes
the renewed prosecution of criminal and civil rights cases winnowed
from the 1950s and 1960s. Part III evaluates the standard conception
of prosecutorial discretion as a justification for retrying race cases.
Part IV analyzes the notion of race-conscious discretion as an alternative justification. Part V assesses the idea of community-guided
restorative discretion as an additional justification. The Essay concludes with a reconsideration of prosecutorial ethics and community
norms in retrying cases of racial violence.
I.

RACE IN LAW AND COMMUNITY

Race colors law, crime, and community. It shadows the performance of public and private roles. It shades the meaning of relationships. And it stains the operating norms of institutions. Narrowly
crafted, this Essay neither transforms the standard conceptions of
criminal-justice roles, relationships, and institutions, nor adjusts the
boundaries of colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious representation. Instead, it parses the meaning of prosecutorial norms and their
function in the context of retrying previously abandoned cases of
white-on-black racial violence. The focal points of the analysis are race
and redemptive community.'
The subjects of race and community have gained increased attention in legal theory and practice. Both the Critical Race Theory' and

7. The themes of race and community unite the essays in this Colloquium. See Richard
Delgado, White Interests and Civil Rights Realism: Rodrigo's Bittersweet Epiphany, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1201 (2003); Margaret M. Russell, CleansingMoments and Retrospective Justice, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1225 (2003); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on
Trial - Again: African American Reparations,Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1269 (2003). For studies of racial reconciliation and redemption, see
HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS
AND WHITES (1995), and ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND
RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999).'

8. See CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997);
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancis eds., 2d
ed. 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
(Kimberld Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL
RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002); see also ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE,
RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1998); MIXED RACE AMERICA AND
THE LAW: A READER (Kevin R. Johnson ed., 2003).
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LatCrit9 movements proclaim, race as central to legal theory and
sociolegal studies. Likewise, both the community prosecution and

defender movements" and the restorative justice movement" declare
community as crucial to legal practice. Race and community seem
equally pivotal to adjudication.12 Yet academics, policymakers, and
practitioners (prosecutors, defenders, and judges) remain at variance
in their appraisals of the normative value and sociolegal meaning of

race and community in the criminal-justice system.
Like the much-debated turn to norms and social meaning in recent

criminal-justice-policy research,13 this Essay challenges the standard
9. See Symposium, LatCrit:Latinas/osand the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997), 10 LA
RAZA L.J. 1 (1998); Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourseof
Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997); see also THE LATINO/A
CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998).
10. The community prosecution movement encourages federal and state prosecutors to
collaborate with local governmental (e.g., police departments and criminal courts) and nongovernmental (e.g., block associations and neighborhood groups) organizations in designing
innovative, community-based crime prevention and law enforcement initiatives. See Elaine
Nugent & Gerard A. Rainville, The State of Community Prosecution:Results of a National
Survey, PROSECUTOR, Mar./Apr. 2001, at 26. By contrast, the community defender movement promotes multidisciplinary approaches to offender rehabilitation, offering individualized support services aimed at community reintegration. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Community
Prosecutors,90 CAL. L. REV. 1465 (2002) [hereinafter Alfieri, Community Prosecutors];Cait
Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the Conceptual and Institutional Boundariesof Providing Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 401 (2001);
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the Chief Public Defender, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 199 (1999); Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a
Community to Prosecute,77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 (2002).
1l. The restorative justice movement addresses both the agents and institutions of the
criminal-justice system, offering prosecutors, defenders, and judges a dissonant ethos of victim-centered offender punishment and offender-specific community restoration. Remarking
on this discord, Robert Cochran observes: "[Rjestorative justice takes the offender's crime
seriously and calls for repentance and restitution." Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Criminal Defense Attorney: Roadblock or Bridge to Restorative Justice, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 211, 213
(1999-2000); see also Frederick W. Gay, Restorative Justice and the Prosecutor,27 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1651 (2000); Daniel W. Van Ness, New Wine and Old Wineskins: Four Challenges
of Restorative Justice, 4 CRIM. L.F. 251 (1993); Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author). On the discordant sociology of punishment, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP
PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990), and
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).
12. See Kathryn Abrams, Critical Strategy and the Judicial Evasion of Difference, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1426 (2000); lan F. Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: JudicialConduct
and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination,109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000); Lis Wiehl, "Sounding Black" in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial Stereotyping, 18 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 185 (2002).
13. Compare Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998), and Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 805 (1998), with Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond
Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
170 (2000), and Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn": Implicationsfor Research Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 179 (2000), and Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cau-
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adversarial conception of criminal-justice roles, relationships, and

institutions. 4 Fundamentally, it contests the partisan, instrumental

tradition of prosecutor roles. Moreover, it disputes prosecutor relationships with offenders, victims, and the state.' 5 Further, it questions

the function of race in prosecutor offices across advocacy, outreach,
and training. For each role, relationship, and institutional practice, the
Essay checks the construction of racial identity in prosecutor narratives, probing for signs of colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious
representation.
Like earlier interdisciplinary approaches to the study of race in
American law drawn from legal anthropology, 6 history, 7 and the law-

and-society movement, 8 the Essay views the social construction of
color in law as a means to understand racial ideology in culture and
society. 9 The task is to gauge the colored discourses - spoken and

tionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
973 (2000).
14. On the standard adversarial conception of lawyering, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 50-103 (1988), and Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER 25-37 (David Luban ed., 1983).
15. Here, the term "state" is used interchangeably to refer to federal, state, and local
entities. The term implies government under the auspices of legislative, judicial, and executive branches operating at national, state, and local levels.
16. See JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY
ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART (1988); JOHN COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF,
ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992); CLIFFORD GEER'rZ, LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); CONTESTED
STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY AND RESISTANCE (Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan F. Hirsh eds.,
1994); John L. Comaroff, The Discourse of Rights in Colonial South Africa: Subjectivity, Sovereignty, Modernity, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 193 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1995); Carol J. Greenhouse, Courting Difference: Issues of Interpretationand
Comparisonin the Study of Legal Ideologies, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 687 (1988); Sally Engle
Merry, Law and Colonialism,25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 889 (1991).
17. See JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994); RACE ON TRIAL: LAW
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Annette Gordon-Reed ed., 2002); William W. Fisher
III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1051 (1993); Robert
W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating
Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determinationin the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J.
109 (1998); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).

1& See RACE, LAW, & CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
(Austin Sarat ed., 1997); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural
Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995).
19. On law and culture, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999); THOMAS ROSS, JUST STORIES: HOW THE
LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS (1996); Paul Schiff Berman, The Cultural Life of Capital
Punishment. Surveying the Benefits of a CulturalAnalysis of Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1129
(2002); Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1149 (1997); and Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: CulturalAnalysis,
Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3 (2001).
See also Jessica M. Silbey, What We Do When We Do Law and Popular Culture,27 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 139 (2002).
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unspoken - of prosecutors inscribed in the texts of criminal-justice
advocacy. My thesis, garnered from prior studies of death penalty and
poverty-law practice,' is that color-tinged criminal-justice narratives
deform the public and private identity of offenders, victims, and their
allied communities.
By narrative I mean story, voiced descriptively or prescriptively.2
Akin to criminal-defense lawyers, prosecutors tell stories about law
and society.22 Everyday they talk of crime, the criminal law, and the
criminal-justice system. They talk in advocacy through opening
statements, direct examinations, and closing arguments at hearings,
trials, and appeals. Their talk, at once prosaic and metaphorical,
echoes in the texts of colloquies, memoranda, and opinions. By text I
mean both the physical record (transcript, brief, or order) and the
social context (law office, jail, or courthouse) of juridical speech and
conduct. The norms and meanings heard in these texts bear moral
consequence.
Liberal theory recognizes the moral import of juridical speech in
its oral, written, and symbolic figurations. The gravity of speech
gathers weight under feminist and critical race readings of law and
sociolegal relations. Derivative of liberalism, these readings depart
from pluralist tendencies toward neutrality and tolerance. For feminists, speech breaches neutrality in the' political economy of the
marketplace and the workplace, causing psychological and economic
harm. The harm may deform the identity of women, as in the case of
pornography, or silence the voice of women, as in the case of a hostile
work environment. Left unregulated, the aggressions of speech reproduce gendered hierarchies of female submission.' For critical race

20. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death
Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (1996); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J 2107
(1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747 (1994) (reviewing GERALD P. LOPEZ,

REBELLIOUS

LAWYERING:

ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF

PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992)).
21. See LAW STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996); LAW'S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC INTHE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
22. See Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996); Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative
Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39 (1994); David Dante Troutt, Screws,
Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality
Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18 (1999); see also Paul Schiff Berman, Rats, Pigs and Statues on Trial: The Creation of Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV, 288 (1994).
23. See ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 24-47 (The
Women's Press Ltd. 1981) (1979); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 206-13 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS
71-110 (1993); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
195-214 (1989); cf NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX,
AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995).
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theorists, speech may strike blows against the body of the self and the
bond of community. The blows of hate speech strike especially hard.
Unimpeded by regulation, the individual and collective assaults of
derogatory speech fortify the lines of segregation. 4
Modem in tone, the proffered readings of feminists and critical
race theorists concerning speech-induced injury extend under postmodern analysis as well. Keenly attentive to the identity grammar of
language, postmodern jurisprudence views the liberal subject
(offender or victim) as the product of interlocking public and private
discourses. For illustration, consider the victim-as-subject. For postmodernists, the very idea of the victim and the experience of victimization are heavily contingent on the accretion of historical portrayals
in culture and society. These discourse-sketched portraits depict
images and convey meanings that describe and prescribe the behavior
expected of victims. Ingrained in the conscious and unconscious mind
and interwoven into society, the discourses - oral and written
histories - manufacture the character and perception of the victim in
the courtroom and in the world. The communication norms regulating
speech at these and other overlapping sites help mold in private
imagination and in public performance the stance of the victim toward
society and the posture of society toward the victim. This complex
interchange in no way forecloses agency: the subjective engagement
with, and intervention upon, the world outside the self. Freedom and
volition persist, albeit in an often highly structured space enclosed by
larger forces and material necessity.'
Both modern and postmodern liberal norms connect dignity to
personhood and liberty to agency. On this logic, when dignity is
diminished, personhood suffers. Similarly, when liberty is curbed by a
caste structure based on an immutable characteristic like race, the
freedom of agency,26 of self-intervention in the outside world, wanes
for individuals, for their affiliated groups, and for their local and even
national communities. To the extent that lawyer speech adversely
24. See MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Petal Nevella Modeste, Race
Hate Speech The Pervasive Badge of Slavery that Mocks the Thirteenth Amendment, 44
HOWARD L.J. 311 (2001); Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of
Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283 (2000).
25. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM
TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE (2000); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN
LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END (1995); PIERRE
SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL

MIND 24 (1996).
26. On the moral agency of the subject in liberal legalism and feminist jurisprudence,
see Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1169 (1998); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995). See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL
JUSTICE 55-80 (1999).
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affects the private self-worth or public caste-standing of participants
(offenders and victims) in the criminal-justice system, it demeans individual dignity and curtails collective liberty in society.
To be sure, neither the debasement of individual dignity nor the
constriction of collective liberty enacted by law or custom and
enforced by state or private action obliterates identity. For offenders
and victims, identity is too deep-rooted in its origins (for example,
family, faith, school) and too multifaceted in its dimensions (for
example, race, gender, class) to be easily upended or dismantled. But
identity may be damaged if ideological discourses are pernicious and
sociolegal conditions are oppressive. The damage is twofold. Dignity
may be so trampled that the integrity or intrinsic value of the wounded
person becomes discounted as negligible. At the same time, liberty
may be so constrained in the spheres of economic exchange, social
intercourse, and political participation that the status of the person or
group becomes derided as marginal.'
The ideology-driven white racial violence of the 1950s and 1960s,
coupled with the repressive regulation of Jim Crow laws, inflicted
widespread damage on black communities throughout the South.'
The damage exceeded simple injury and death to exact both dignitary
and stigma harm. Rationalized by habits of discourse and reinforced
by the force of law and vigilante violence, the harm belittled black
racial dignity, negating the integrity of individual citizens and the
value of whole communities. Deemed naturally or necessarily subordinate in commerce, culture, and civic governance, the same harm
cabined black liberty, relegating black citizens to the status of economic marginality, social inferiority, and political disenfranchisement.
The resurgent prosecution of crimes of racial violence committed
nearly a half century ago affords an occasion to reconsider the operation of the criminal-justice system in repairing the degradation of
black dignitary and liberty interests. Reconsideration entails the application of a retrospective and contextual ethical valence, a valence that
shifts backward and forward to explain prosecutorial inaction or

27. See JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY (1990); William

H. Simon, Three Limitations of Deliberative Democracy: Identity Politics, Bad Faith,and Indeterminacy, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT

49 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999) [hereinafter DELIBERATIVE POLITICS]; Iris Marion Young,
Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
102 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003); Iris Marion Young, Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON
REASON AND POLITICS 383 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); Iris Marion
Young, Justice, Inclusion, and Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra,
at 151.
28. See JOHN DITrMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN
MISSISSIPPI (1994); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY,

1890-2000 (2001); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 1954-1980
(1981).

March20031

Retrying Race

1151

failure when crimes of racial violence go unpunished and to justify
prosecutorial action when such crimes undergo penalty. It is precisely
this search for justification that drives the present inquiry.
At first blush, justification for the resurgent prosecution of cases of
white-on-black racial violence years after their disparate criminal acts
and their subsequently aborted or failed trials seems apparent. It is a
justification rooted in the regularly intoned belief in a protean politics
of race. Applicable to both southern and northern precincts, this vague
incantation suggests that accumulated decades of emancipatory
changes in American culture and society, joined by coextensive
transformations in politics and economics, gradually liberated prosecutors to renew their campaign against racially motivated violence.
Put aside for the moment that the historical record furnishes scant
evidence of a prosecutor-mounted anti-terror campaign. 9 In fact,
taken as a whole, the cases discussed here display small semblance of
cohesion or organization. Scattered across numerous states and varied
factual landscapes, they resemble the diffuse product of ad hoc decisionmaking, rather than the regimented logic of an egalitarian crusade.
Despite this erratic record and the ambiguity of redemption, the
politics of race theorem casts prosecutors not only as redeemers, but
also as prisoners. Imprisoned by history, their revelation to take up the
cause of freedom comes late. History, however, is a multifarious
warden. It dictates through state functionaries, among them legislators, judges, administrators, and sheriffs. It disciplines through evolving cultural and social mores.
Casting prosecutors as captive cultural and social artifacts or
reflexive state instruments is troubling. Even at a glance, the account
seems deterministic. It supplies crude treatments of agency and causation. More disquieting, the account seems tied by a strand of legal
nihilism. It denigrates the role of law, professional norms, and legal
ethics in guiding the prosecution function. Neither of these observations is meant to deny the force of culture and society or the power of
the political arm of the state to twist prosecutorial decisionmaking.
But no ideology banishes choice. And no state, acting through the
delegated powers of legislatures, courts, and enforcement agencies, is
omnipotent. Both impress freedom and constraint on the office of the
prosecutor.
Mired in liberalism and its heralded autonomy of law, this Essay
rejects an untrammeled politics of race justification for the resurgent
29. See ROBERT J, KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 43-44, 10113 (1985); BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1997); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE

AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 (1980); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and
the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 3942 (1996).

1152

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1141

prosecution of white-on-black racial violence. In fairness, the rejection
is only partial. It acknowledges the influence of culture, society, and
political economy on the prosecutor's station. Furthermore, it admits
the potency of the state's grip on that station. Nonetheless, it balks at
the suggestion that law and the norms of the profession hold no sway
over the discharge of the prosecutor's duties. The duties may be
circumscribed and the norms corrupted, yet they enter into the daily
calculus of prosecutorial discretion in race cases. The task is to
ascertain the capacity of such norms, and their corresponding ethical
precepts, to infiltrate the race-besieged consciousness of prosecutors
at the midpoint and at the turn of the century. The path into lawyer
consciousness leads to discretion. Here, that path is bordered by color.
The idea of color pervades American law and the criminal-justice
system. It suffuses advocacy and adjudication as well as legislation and
law enforcement. Its boundary lines shift, sometimes detectable, sometimes coded. The notion of colorblind representation resonates deeply
in the process-oriented constitutional jurisprudence of the criminal
law,' appealing to a sense of neutrality, procedural fairness, and evenhanded justice.3 The notion of color-coded representation, in
comparison, evokes an instrumental, result-oriented jurisprudence of
subterfuge, entailing covert stratagem, veiled motive, and pretext.32 By
contrast, the notion of color-conscious representation invokes a
remedial, egalitarian jurisprudence of restoration and reparation,
broadly applicable to the fields of education,33 employment, 34 and

30. See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992). For a critique of
colorblind neutrality, see MATTHEW B. ROBINSON, JUSTICE BLIND: IDEALS AND REALITIES
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2002), and Reva B. Siegel, Discriminationin the Eyes of

the Law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification,88
CAL. L. REV. 77 (2000).
31. On procedural fairness as justice, see JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS (Samuel
Freeman ed., 1999); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed.,

2001), and JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed., 1999).
32. See BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE RACE
CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAW (1998); Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression,98 YALE L.J,
1559 (1989); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161

(1995); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
33. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, California'sRacial History and Constitutional
Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision Making in Higher Education, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1521 (2000); Paul Diller, Note, Integration Without Classification: Moving Toward RaceNeutrality in the Pursuit of Public Elementary and Secondary School Diversity, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1999 (2001).

34. See John Cocchi Day, Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action: Reflections on a
Decade of FederalJurisprudencein the Public Workplace, 89 CAL. L. REV. 59 (2001).
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voting. 35 To better understand the classifications of colored discourse
in criminal law and advocacy, consider the category of race cases.
II. RACE CASES
Race cases provide a categorical site for the intersection of law,
culture, and society. The current prosecution of decades-old criminal
and civil rights cases for long-neglected racial wrongs demarcates one
such site. From an antebellum starting point, the trials preserve elements of the Middle Passage history of race in the law of slavery. This
history chronicles the common law of contract, tort, and property, and
the criminal law of slave codes.36 From a postbellum perspective, the
trials extend traces of the Reconstruction history of race in the law of
emancipation. This history records the conjunction of statutory
freedoms, common-law privileges, and criminal-law proscriptions.37
Under both antebellum and postbellum regimes, the trials of race
cases mirror the surrounding culture, politics, and sociology of race.
Indeed, the law of race is shaped by, and in turn shapes, the culture,
political economy, and social structure of race.
A. A Genealogy of Race Cases
The history of race cases spans more than two centuries of
American law.' The task of surveying such wide-ranging cases

35. See Mark Crain, The Constitutionalityof Race-Conscious Redistricting:An Empirical
Analysis, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (2001); John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Ra-

cial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan
Gerrymanders,56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489 (2002).

36. See

ARIELA J. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER: SLAVERY AND MASTERY IN THE

ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN COURTROOM (2000); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in
the Cotton Industry: CreatingCooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions,99 MICH.

L. REV. 1724 (2001); Ariela J. Gross, "Like Master, Like Man": Constructing Whiteness in
the Commercial Law of Slavery, 1800-1861, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 263 (1996); Thomas D.

Russell, A New Image of the Slave Auction: An Empirical Look at the Role of Law in Slave
Sales and a Conceptual Reevaluationof Slave Property,18 CARDOZO L. REV, 473 (1996).
37. See EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984); ERIC FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM:
EMANCIPATION AND ITS LEGACY (1983); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO

FREEDOM (1967); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law Only as an Enemy": The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum
Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969 (1992); Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal,and Contract
Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269 (1994); see also Florence Wagman Roisman, The Impact of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 on Racially DiscriminatoryDonative Transfers, 53 ALA. L. REV. 463
(2002).
38. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (4th ed. 2001);
MICHAEL F. HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND QUESTIONS (2001);
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan F. Perea et al.
eds., 2000).
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embroils the idea and historiography of race.39 No attempt will be
made here to settle those controversies or to compile a comprehensive

catalogue of race cases. However laudable, such endeavors exceed the
grasp of this Essay. Instead, the idea of race and the history of its
prosecution will be tapered to reported accounts of black victims of
white violence during a roughly ten-year period of the mid-twentieth
century. Earlier periods inform these accounts, notably the colonial,'
Reconstruction 4 ' and Jim Crow 42 eras. In the same way, antecedent
43
cultural and social conditions animate the character of the accounts.
The conditions impact upon the gendered and ethnic composition of
racial identity, the form of racialized narrative, and the racial content

of crime and criminal justice."
Against that backdrop, the inclusion of civil disputes, criminal
prosecutions, and civil rights proceedings in a catalogue of race cases,
while appropriate, overtaxes this inquiry. Unsurprisingly, the civil

cases of paramount interest stem predominantly from nineteenth-

century slave-holding disputes under contract, tort, and property law.45
39. See CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, RACIAL VIOLENCE ON TRIAL (2001); RACIAL
CLASSIFICATION AND HISTORY (E. Nathaniel Gates ed., 1997).
40. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR - RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978); ALDEN T. VAUGHAN,
ROOTS OF AMERICAN RACISM: ESSAYS ON THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 128-74 (1995);
ALBERT J. VON FRANK, THE TRIALS OF ANTHONY BURNS: FREEDOM AND SLAVERY IN
EMERSON'S BOSTON (1998).
41. See EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER

RECONSTRUCTION (1993); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL
WAR (1994); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1982); see
also RICHARD PAUL FUKE, IMPERFECT EQUALITY: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE
CONFINES OF WHITE RACIAL ATTITUDES IN POST-EMANCIPATION MARYLAND (1999); AT
FREEDOM'S DOOR: AFRICAN AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN

RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAROLINA (James Lowell Underwood & W. Lewis Burke, Jr.
eds., 2000).
42. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1966); see also
STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL (1988);
Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Careerof Jim Crow: Lower FederalCourts and the "Separate but Equal" Doctrine,1865-1896, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 17 (1984).
43. See FRANKIE Y. BAILEY & ALICE P. GREEN, "LAW NEVER HERE": A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN RESPONSES TO ISSUES OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (1999);

Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 640 (2001).
44. See KATHLEEN M. BROWN, GOOD WIVES, NASTY WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS
PATRIARCHS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1996); CARL
GUTIERREZ-JONES, CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES: A STUDY OF RACE, RHETORIC AND
INJURY (2001); RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A
TROUBLESOME WORD (2002); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO
FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2003); ERIC W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE SEVEN: RACE, RAPE AND

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1995); Randall L. Kennedy, "Nigger!" as a Problem in the Law,
2001 ILL. L. REV. 935.
45. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975); ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS
SLAVERY IN TWO AMERICAN CENTURIES (1998).
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The disputes determine the meaning of skin color and the norms of
racial status.' Contemporary civil and criminal cases equally engage
color 7 and status. 8 Civil rights cases, branching out from postbellum
constitutional amendments and federal statutes, also confront domi-

nant stereotypes and status distinctions. 9

The social construction of color is basic to race-contaminated civil,
criminal, and civil rights proceedings." The process of construction
occurs through the identity-making discourses of racial difference and
hierarchy." Difference, manifested in identity and culture, provokes
the separation of division. Preserving the divisions and exclusions of
hierarchy demands an abiding consciousness of race. Consciousness

hinges on the reproduction of identity and narrative.
Stirred by interracial animus, race cases highlight the symbolic
authority of racial identity and the rhetorical power of racialized
narratives. Acts of bigotry and violence erupt out of identity distinctions based on status and narrative rationales. The distinctions rest on
axioms of black moral and cultural inferiority deduced from
antebellum principles of racial hierarchy as well as ingrained habits of
subordinating construction." The hierarchies depend on dominant and
subordinate socioeconomic ranking. Race-based status distinctions

46. See Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determinationin the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998); see also Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A
Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705 (2000); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The
Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000); Judith Kelleher Schafer, "Under the Present
Mode of Trial,Improper Verdicts Are Very Often Given": CriminalProcedurein the Trials of
Slaves in Antebellum Louisiana,18 CARDOZO L. REV. 635 (1996).
47. See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CAL. L. REV. 41
(2000); Julie Novkov, Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in Alabama, 1890-1934, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 225 (2002); see also Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against
the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002).
48. See Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and
Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45 (1998); Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense
Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice,8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1994).
49. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, FederalEnforcement of Civil Rights Duringthe First Reconstruction, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155 (1995); Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State
and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 509 (1994); see also Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in
Civil Rights and PrisonerCases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1989).
50. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE
BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 111-53 (1996); Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Constructionof Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,and Choice, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L L. REV. 1 (1994).
51. See Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures
of Racial Hierarchyand Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. L. REV. 11 (2001); Kim Benita Furumoto, Boundariesof the Racial State: Two Faces of Racist Exclusion in United States Law,
17 HARV. BLACKLETER L.J. 85 (2001).
52. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000);
STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001).
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and
hierarchies pervade the laws, legal institutions, and sociolegal relations
of the criminal-justice system. 3 The laws of criminal codes and procedure indulge race. 4 The offices of federal and state prosecutors exploit
it." Even the relationships between the prosecutor and victim, and

conversely, the criminal defender and offender, mull its consequence.'
Racial identity lies at the core of hierarchies in the laws, institu-

tions, and relations of advocacy and adjudication. Identity is carved

into seemingly immutable stereotypes. 7 In the civil-and-criminal
justice system, stereotypes warp symbols and skew speech. Advancing
case-by-case, the stereotypes privilege unequal configurations of
public and private rights and duties. Accrued over time, they infect

constitutional interpretation, statutory construction, and common law
adjudication."
53. On racial hierarchies in the criminal-justice system, see JEROME G. MILLER,
SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES INTHE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(1996); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR,
BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS (1998);
David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era:
An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1638 (1998); David Cole, Foreword, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered A
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1074-82 (1999);
Bernard E. Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal Law: The Relationship
Between Images of Criminal Defendants and Ideologies of Criminal Law in Southern
Antebellum and Modern Appellate Decisions, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1165, 1184-96, 1199-1204,
1205-46 (1995); and Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination:
A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1994). See generally Note, Constitutional Risks to
Equal Protection in the Criminal Justice System, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2098 (2001); Developments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472 (1988).
54. On racial status distinctions in the criminal law, see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995); Devon
W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L.
261 (1996); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 333 (1998); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1283 (1995); and Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999).
55. On prosecutorial exploitation of race in federal and state forums, see Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1044-45 (2003) (citing statistical and historical evidence of racial
discrimination in jury selection by Dallas County, Texas, prosecutors, including an officewide "culture of discrimination"); and Drew S. Days III, Race and the Federal Criminal Justice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REV. 180 (1996).
56. See Elizabeth L. Earle, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An Approach to the Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1992); M. Shanara Gilbert, An
Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional Prescription for Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive
Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1855 (1993); Andrea D. Lyon, Setting the Record Straight: A
Proposal for Handling Prosecutorial Appeals to Racial, Ethnic or Gender Prejudice During
Trial, 6 MICH. J. RACE& L. 319 (2001).
57. See Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375 (1999).
58. See MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURNOF-THE-CENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED 100 YEARS OF FEDERALISM (1999); Pam-
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The colors of black and white dominate racial stereotypes. Forged

from antebellum and postbellum categories, the colors erect and
reproduce a dichotomy of black guilt and white innocence. This
dichotomy is integral to the narrative form and substance of criminal
and civil rights disputes. 9 It produces false public pronouncements of
black culpability and hollow proclamations of white virtue. These
mixed declarations of law and fact carry their own logic and bring

internal coherence to race cases.
The law itself maps the initial contours of race cases. Traced here,

the substantive doctrines of criminal and civil rights law inject race
into the methods of law enforcement, the strategies of advocacy, and

the standards of adjudication. Consider, for example, racial profiling 6'
and hate crimes.6 Racial profiling affects law enforcement and charging. Hate crimes impact upon indictment and sentencing. The procedural rules of federal and state practice also interpose race into the
tactics of advocacy and the iterations of judicial rulings. Consider, for
instance, the continuing furor over equality interests in criminal pro-

cedure and jury selection. Equality issues vex suppression hearings
and capital sentencing schemes.62 Equal or fair representation issues
rankle judges in reviewing jury peremptory challenges.63

ela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001
(1998); William G. Ross, The ConstitutionalSignificance of the Scottsboro Cases, 28 CUMB.
L. REV. 591 (1997-1998).
59. On the blackiwhite dichotomy in criminal and civil rights narratives, see RICHARD
DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE
164-89 (1995); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611, 1616-51 (1985); and Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence
and Black Abstraction,32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1990). See also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS,
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
60. See Brandon Garrett, Standing While Black: DistinguishingLyons in Racial Profiling
Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815 (2000); Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization:Racial
Profilingand the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689 (2000); Samuel R. Gross &
Debra Livingston, Racial ProfilingUnder Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002); Gregory
M. Lipper, Racial Profiling,38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 551 (2001); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With
an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: PretextualStops and DoctrinalRemedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409 (2000).

61. See JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND
HATE CRIMES (2002); JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATES CRIMES: CRIMINAL
LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS (1998); VALERIE JENNESS, MAKING HATE A CRIME: FROM
SOCIAL MOVEMENT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT (2001); BARBARA PERRY, IN THE NAME OF
HATE: UNDERSTANDING HATE CRIMES (2001); see also Sara Sun Beale, FederalizingHate
Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement, 80 B.U. L
REV. 1227 (2000).
62. See Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in ConstitutionalCriminal
Procedures:From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359 (2001);
Lewis R. Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on Race in America, 52 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 471, (2001).
63. See Samuel R. Gross, Race, Peremptories,and CapitalJury Deliberations,3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 283 (2001); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A
TrialJudge's Perspective,64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (1997); see also Robin Charlow, Tolerating
Deception and DiscriminationAfter Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 21-27, 31-40 (1997); Susan
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The race of judges and the racial composition of juries also demarcate race cases. For judges, racial biography may sway findings of fact

and conclusions of law in formalist and instrumental directions, as
demonstrated in slave code and civil rights enforcement.' For juries,
racial biography may tilt evidentiary weighing and legal deliberation,

as shown in jury nullification.65 Race-tainted cognitive prisms may
afflict parties, victims, and lawyers as well. The racial identity of
parties rouses client-lawyer and client-community tensions.' Victim
identity induces strain over prosecutorial abuse and bias, as seen in
protests about revictimization, victims' rights, and victim impact
statements.6 7 Lawyer-racial identity, as counsel and as adversary,' also

mediates criminal and civil rights cases, as the divergent history of the
profession and the black bar prove.6 9 Taken together, these markings
indicate the external form and internal structure of race cases.70

N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness,
and the Jury, 67 TUL.L. REV. 1807 (1993); Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture
(Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges,35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21 (1993); Kenneth J.
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1996).
64. See J.W. PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION (1978); LINN WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE (1994); Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Civil Rights Lawyers on the Bench, 91 YALE L.J. 814 (1982) (reviewing JACK
BASS: UNLIKELY HEROES (1981)); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity,
Impartialityand Representationon State Trial Courts,39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997).
65. See Long X. Do, Jury Nullification and Race-Conscious Reasonable Doubt: Overlapping Reifications of Commonsense Justice and the PotentialVoir Dire Mistake, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 1843 (2000); Simon Stem, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationalesfor Jury Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815 (2001); see
also Walter Rugaber, Trial of 18 Chargedwith Conspiracy in Mississippi Goes to All-White
Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.19, 1967, at 37.
66. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470,482-93 (1976); Clark D. Cunningham,
The Lawyer as Translator,Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients:
Thinking About Law As Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman,
Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators,104 YALE LJ.763 (1995).
67. See Katie Long, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim's Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 187 (1995); Walker A. Matthews, III, Proposed Victims' Rights
Amendment: Ethical Considerationsfor the PrudentProsecutor, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
735 (1998); Uli Orth, Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by CriminalProceedings, 15
SOC. JUST. RES. 313 (2002).
6& See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLINICAL L.
REV. 9 (1994); Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys
and the Straitjacket of Legal Practice,95 MICH. L. REV. 766 (1997); David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502
(1998); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment Should a Black Lawyer
Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030 (1995); see also Bernie D. Jones,
Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 18 HARV.
BLACKLETrER L.J. 1 (2002); Elaine R. Jones & Jaribu Hill, Contemporary Civil Rights
Struggle: The Role of Black Attorneys, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 185 (1999-2000).
69. See J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER
1844-1944, at 541-610 (1993); Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early
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The Reprosecution of Race Cases

The race cases in this preliminary study are culled from a score of
criminal and civil rights proceedings in both northern and southern
courts. For the northern states - Indiana and Pennsylvania - the
cases arose late in the history of black industrial migration 1 For the
southern states - Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi - the cases
emerged during the middle period of the evolution of the New South.72
Like earlier postbellum incidents of lynching,73 many of the cases grew
out of vigilante forms of private violence variously aided or condoned
by state agents. Precipitated by virulent opposition to the civil rights
movement, the cases often attracted national attention. 74
The violence engulfing the civil rights movement and spawning the
proceedings at issue here illustrates the historical bonds of race, law,
and community. Those bonds are forged in the trial and retrial of race
cases under the aegis of prosecutorial discretion. In the criminaljustice system, both easy and hard cases are products of discretion.
Although bounded by Jim Crow laws and customs (all-white juries
and witness reprisals), the cases are manufactured from familiar materials: physical evidence and witness testimony of white-on-black violence. Easy cases rediscover omitted and suppressed evidentiary materials. Hard cases reweigh neglected criminal-justice norms in parsing
extant evidence. For examples of evidence-driven easy cases, consider
the histories of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing, Medgar
Evers, Vernon Dahmer, Carol Jenkins, and Lillie Belle Allen.
Turn first to the 1963 bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist
Church in Birmingham, Alabama.75 On Sunday morning, September

NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97 (2002); David B. Wilkins, Comment, Class
Not Race in Legal Ethics: Or Why Hierarchy Makes Strange Bedfellows, 20 LAW & HIST.
REV. 147 (2002).
70. For an initial mapping of race case genealogy, see Alfieri, Race Trials,supra note 1,
at 1305-23.
71. See NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION

AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991).
72. See C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913 (1951).
73. See W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND

VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993); PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE
LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA (2002); STEWART E. TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL

OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930 (1995); GEORGE C.
WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE, AND
"LEGAL LYNCHINGS" (1990).

74. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL
VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT INTHE POST-BROWN SOUTH (1987); Michal R.

Belknap, The Vindication of Burke Marshall: The Southern Legal System and the Anti-Civil
Rights Violence of the 1960s, 33 EMORY L.J. 93 (1984).
75. See DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2001).
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15, 1963, a bomb exploded in the basement of the Sixteenth Street
Baptist Church, killing four children, ages eleven to fourteen: Denise

McNair, Carole Robertson, Cynthia Wesley, and Addie Mae Collins.
Hindered by the FBI, state and federal prosecutors failed to marshal
indictments. In 1971, Alabama prosecutors reopened the case and in
1977 indicted Klansman Robert E. Chambliss, citing the inculpatory
testimony of Chambliss's niece. An Alabama court convicted
Chambliss and sentenced him to prison where he died in 1985.76 In
1995, at the urging of the Birmingham-black community, the FBI
reopened its controversial investigation. In 2000, state and federal

prosecutors indicted Klansmen Thomas E. Blanton, Jr. and Bobby
Frank Cherry." Alabama courts held Cherry mentally incompetent to
stand trial but convicted Blanton of first-degree murder.'8
Similarly, consider the 1963 murder of Medgar Evers, a thirtyseven-year-old NAACP Field Secretary, in Belzoni, Mississippi. On
the night of June 12, 1963, Evers was shot in the back outside his
home. Mississippi prosecutors indicted Klansman Byron De La
Beckwith for the murder. Two 1964 trials ended in mistrials. In 1990,
upon public disclosure of suspected jury tampering gleaned from

Mississippi Sovereignty Commission records, prosecutors reindicted
Beckwith. The trial court convicted Beckwith; he died in prison.7 9

76. See Drummond Ayres Jr., 'Amens' at Church in Birmingham Are Loud After
Bombing Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1977, at 24; Wayne King, Indictments Recall Terror

of Birmingham Sunday in 1963, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1977, at 18; Alabama Does Right by
Martyrs, HARTFORD COURANT, May 6, 2001, at C2; Ex-Klansman Indicted in '63 Bombing

That Killed 4, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1977, at 20; FBIAgents Honoredfor Helping Solve 1963
Church Bomb Case, L.A TIMES, Nov. 14,2002, at A19.

77. See Marion Manuel, Church Bombing Trial Aims for Healing: Progressive Prosecutor, Nagging Consciences and New Power Structures Try to Make Up for Decades of Delays,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 23, 2001, at Al; Marion Manuel, Church Bombing Trial 'Worth

the Wait', ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 23, 2001, at A6; Janita Poe, Birmingham Bombing Victims: Church Bomber Guilty, at Last, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 23, 2002, at Al; Janita Poe,

Revisiting 'Bombingham'; Birmingham Aims Marketing Campaign Within City Limits as 39year-old Trial Reawakens Lingering Doubts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 11, 2002, at Al
[hereinafter Poe, Revisiting 'Bombingham']; Tatsha Robertson, Righting Our Uncivilized

Wrongs: Reopened Race Murder Cases May Yet Add Justice to an Era, BOSTON GLOBE, May
6, 2001, at El; Kevin Sack, An Alabama Prosecutor Confronts the Burden of History, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2001, at A8; Cynthia Tucker, In Birmingham, Justice Is Late for Four Little,
Girls, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 21, 2000, at B5.

78. See Marion Manuel, Church Bombing Verdict: Justice Served, FBI Man Says; ExKlansman Guilty in 37-year-old Case, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 2, 2001, at 1A; Poe, Revisiting 'Bombingham,' supra note 77; Howell Raines, The Birmingham Bombing, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 1983, §6 (Magazine), at 12; Stephanie Saul, FBI Outreach Led to Bombing Arrests,
NEWSDAY, May 19,2000, at A6.
79. See BOBBY DELAUGHTER, NEVER TOO LATE: 'A PROSECUTOR'S STORY OF
JUSTICE IN THE MEDGAR EVERS CASE (2001); MARYANNE VOLLERS, GHOSTS OF
MISSISSIPPI: THE MURDER OF MEDGAR EVERS, THE TRIALS OF BYRON DE LA BECKWITH,
AND THE HAUNTING OF THE NEW SOUTH (1995); Todd Taylor, Exorcising the Ghosts of a

Shamefid Past: The Third Trial and Conviction of Byron De La Beckwith, 16 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 359 (1996) (reviewing VOLLERS, supra); Christina Cheakalos, Around the

South: No Big Breaks in Old Racial Slayings: Beckwith Case Seen as a Rarity, ATLANTA J.-
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Likewise, consider the 1966 murder of Vernon Dahmer, a grocery
store owner and the President of the Harrisburg, Mississippi, NAACP.
On January 10, 1966, Klansmen firebombed Dahmer's house at night.
He died of smoke inhalation after exchanging gunfire with Klansmen,
enabling his family to escape. Mississippi prosecutors indicted

Klansman Sam Bowers for the murder. At trial, Mississippi juries
twice acquitted Bowers. Prosecutors also indicted William Smith for
the murder. Smith's first state trial ended in a hung jury amid charges

of jury tampering. A second state trial court convicted Smith and
sentenced him to prison. In 1998, again following public disclosure of

Mississippi Sovereignty Commission evidence, prosecutors reindicted
Bowers. A third Mississippi trial court convicted Bowers and sentenced him to life imprisonment.s'
Further, consider the 1968 murder of Carol Jenkins, a twenty-oneyear-old aspiring model, in Martinsville, Indiana. On September 16,
1968, Jenkins was stabbed to death while selling encyclopedias doorto-door. An Indiana police investigation failed to name a suspect or
make an arrest. On May 8, 2002, based on new evidence supplied by a
child eyewitness, state prosecutors indicted Kenneth Clay Richmond
for murder. Indiana courts held Richmond incompetent to stand trial;
he died in jail.8
CONST., Feb. 10, 1994, at A3; Willa J. Conrad, One Man's Stand: Medgar Evers' [sic] Heroism Unleashes a Composer's Imagination, STAR-LEDGER (New Jersey), Mar. 4, 2002, at 21;
Anne Rochell Konigsmark, Civil Wrongs; Pressure Builds to Reopen the Unsolved Murders
of Rights Activists in 1960s, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 21, 1999, at Ml; Adam Nossiter, As
South Changes, Civil Rights Murders Being ProbedAnew: Thirstfor Justice Can'tBe Buried
by the Decades, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 19, 1989, at Dl; Adam Nossiter, 27 Years
Later, Evers Slaying Gets Another Look, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 15, 1990, at A3; John
Shearer, Civil Rights Era Cases Endure; As ProsecutorsPursue Justice Decades Later, the
Wife of a Man Convicted for a Notorious Crime 1963 Murder Calls Him Innocent, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Sept. 7, 2000, at Cl; Editorials:South Atoning for Racist Murders, ATLANTA J.CONST., Nov. 10, 1999, at A18; see also De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 554-65
(Miss. 1997).
80. See John Gibeaut, Confronting a Dark Past, 84 A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 26; J. Whyatt
Mondesire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Modern Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 435,440-41 (2001); Rick Bragg, Jurors Convict Former Wizard in Klan Murder,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at Al; Jerry Mitchell, Evers Case Opened Doors, CLARIONLEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), May 26, 2002, at Al; Earnest Reese, Prosecutorsto Re-Examine
Activist's Slaying; Klan Implicated& The Slaying of Vernon Dahmer in Mississippi 29 Years
Ago Brought Four Convictions, But Some Say More Needs to Be Done, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Apr. 9, 1995, at A3; Anne Rochell, Racial Slaying: New Trial Reopens Bitter Era, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Aug. 17, 1998, at Al; Peter Scott & Andy Miller, A Beginning: Racist Killings Reopened: New Probes Spark Hopes for Justice, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 3, 1991, at A16;
Alan Sverdlik, Activist's Family Renews Callfor Trials: Vernon Dahmer Was Killed in 1966,
But His Case Isn't Dead, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 1, 1995, at B5; see also Rick Bragg,
Memories of a Deadly Assault in 1996 Are Reawakened at Klan Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
1998, at A16; Mike Williams, Focus on Sovereignty Commission: Files Might Provide Some
Peace, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 18, 1998, at B2.
81. See Dick Kaukas, S. Indiana City's Residents Want Racist Image Relegated to Past,
COURIER J. (Louisville), July 1, 2002, at Al; Mike Ellis, Decades-Old Case Challenges System, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 28, 2002, at Al; Sharon Jenkins & Anare V. Holmes, Justice
for Carol Jenkins, a Human Being: Martyred Girl Touched Thousands of Lives,
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Finally, consider the 1969 murder of Lillie Belle Allen, a twentyseven-year-old mother of two children, in York, Pennsylvania. On July

21, 1969, armed white-gang members shot Allen when her car stalled
in a white neighborhood during a race riot. York police officers failed
to conduct a thorough investigation or survey eyewitnesses. Decades
later, officers pursuing a related investigation discovered overlooked
witness testimony and forensic evidence. On that evidence,
Pennsylvania prosecutors indicted ten white gang members; nine have
received sentences - seven under plea agreements.82

Admittedly abridged, these five case histories highlight the
evidence-specific quality of easy cases in the reprosecution of race
trials. That quality, however, is misleading. Indeed, to mention the
relevance of suppressed FBI reports and government documents, or to
cite omitted eyewitness testimony and forensic findings, obscures a
more basic normative point. Plainly, such evidentiary material is relevant to the prosecution or reprosecution of race cases. But deploying
that material to advance the remedial purposes of reprosecution is a
normative undertaking. Prosecutorial discretion in reprosecuting race
cases is precisely such an undertaking. It is the normative threshold of
race case reprosecutions: hard and easy. Exercising the required
judgment entailed in crossing the threshold may undermine the distinction posed here. Easy cases in fact may prove to be a kind of
stalking horse. Their pursuit seems to collapse into the same judgments demanded of hard cases. Put differently, to the extent that all
race cases involve a crucible of judgment, easy cases may be distinguished chiefly by their post hoc rationale: old evidence newly discovered. For examples of more generalizable, norm-driven hard cases,
INDIANAPOLIS RECORDER, June 7,2002, at Al; Don Terry, 34 Years Later, Sad Secret Surfaces; Childhood Memory May Solve Slaying, CHI. TRIB., May, 12,2002, at 1; Seeking Justice,
Decades Later, HARTFORD COURANT, May 20, 2002, at A6; cf Bruce C. Smith, Murder Suspect Dies of Cancer, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 1, 2002, at Al (noting that Richmond died
in a state mental-health facility).
82. See Russ Crenshaw, Search for Hope Continues in York 25 Years After Violence of
1969: The Riots Ripped the City Apart. In Some Places, the Wounds Remain Open, YORK
DAILY RECORD, Aug. 4, 1994, at Al; Rick Lee & Teresa Ann Boeckel, Slick Sent to Prison:
He Was the Ninth Man Sentenced in the 1969 Killing of Lillie Belle Allen, YORK DAILY REC.,
May 29, 2003, at A8; Marc Levy, Man Pleads Guilty in 1969 Killing: It's 6th Plea Bargain in
Pa. Race-Riot Slaying of Black Woman, 27, CHARLO-TE OBSERVER, Aug. 30, 2002, at A14;
Jim Lynch et al., Verdict Writes History: Jurors' Decision Brings the County's Most Famous
Case Since the Hex Trial to an End, YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 21, 2002, at All; Timothy D.
May, City Faces Racial Killings 3 Decades Later, TIMES UNION (Albany), Sept. 24, 2000, at
A25; Timothy D. May, Pennsylvania City Confronts 2 Racial Killings 31 Years Later Justice:
A Mob Killed a Black Woman Days After a White Policeman was Slain in York. No One Was
Ever Chargedin Either Death, But Cases Are Being Reopened, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, at
A3; Background: Race Riots, '68 and '69, YORK DAILY REC., Sept. 26, 2000, at A7; Four
Admit Guilt in '69 York Race Killings, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 15, 2002, at 9; Guilty Pleas
Begin a Time of Healing: The Book on the 1969 Riots Can Begin to Close, as Four Men did
the Right Thing by Admitting Guilt, YORK DAILY REC., Aug. 18,2002, at 2; Opinion: Murder
Case Full of Choices, YORK DAILY REC., Dec. 20, 2001, at A8.
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consider the histories of Harry and Harriet Moore; Willie Edwards,
Jr.; the Bethel Baptist Church bombing; Michael Schwerner, Andrew
Goodman, and James Chaney; Oneal Moore; Ben Brown; Ben Chester White; Rainey Pool; Henry Hezekiah Dee and Charles Eddie
Moore; and Wharlest Jackson.
Turn first to the earliest of these cases, the 1951 murders of Harry
and Harriette Moore in Mims, Florida. On December 25, 1951, a
bomb exploded under the bedroom of the Moore's small wood frame
house, killing Harry, a NAACP activist, and gravely injuring
Harriette, who died eight days later. An FBI investigation of the Klan
in Orange County, Florida, and a 1952 federal grand jury in Miami
produced perjury indictments in 1953 but no arrests. Florida officials
subsequently reopened the investigation in 1978 and 1991, finally
closing the case in April 1992 for lack of evidence.83
Turn next to the 1957 murder of Willie Edwards, Jr., a twenty-fiveyear-old black truck driver in Montgomery, Alabama. Edwards failed
to return home from work on January 23, 1957. In April of 1957,
fishermen found Edwards's decomposed body in the Alabama River.
Notwithstanding suspicions of a Ku Klux Klan abduction, state
officials ruled the death an accident by drowning because of insufficient evidence. In 1976, the state attorney general opened a homicide
investigation and indicted three Montgomery Klansmen for murder:
William Kyle Livingston, Jr., Henry Alexander, and James York. The
indictment accused the Klansmen of forcing Edwards to leap to his
death from the Tyler Goodwin Bridge on January 23, 1957 for
allegedly making advances toward a white woman. Despite Britt's
grand jury testimony, bargained in exchange for immunity, an
Alabama court twice dismissed the indictment for lack of a specific
cause of death. In 1992, near death, Alexander confessed to the
murder. Pressed by the Edwards family to reopen the investigation, in
1997 prosecutors exhumed Edwards's body, officially ruled his death a
homicide, and reconvened a grand jury to seek a second murder
indictment. In 1999, the grand jury failed to return an indictment.'
83. See BEN GREEN, BEFORE His TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HARRY T. MOORE,

AMERiCA'S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS MARTYR (1999); Philip Morgan, The Martyr, TAMPA
TRIB., Nov. 5, 2000, at 1; Ormund Powers, Book Revives Debate About Fatal Christmas1951
Bombing, LAKE TRIB., May 19, 1999, at 3; Harry Wessel, Civil Rights Leader Gets His Due,
ORLANDO SENTINELTRIB., Aug. 1, 1999, at F-7 (reviewing GREEN, supra); Healing Old
Wound ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 15, 1999, at A14; PBS, Freedom Never Dies: The
Legacy of Harry T. Moore - Florida Terror - Who Killed Harry T. Moore, at http://www.
pbs.org/harrymoore/terror/who.html (last visited July 30,2003).
84. See Ray Jenkins, Alabama Slaying Laid to Klansmen; Former Member Testifies
Against Others Accused in Montgomery Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1976, at 13; Adam
Nossiter, Widow Inherits a Confession to a 36-Year-Old Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1993, at A5; Alabama Witness of Alleged Slaying Admits an Error,N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1976,
at 17; 3 Named as Klan Members Plead Not Guilty in Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1976, at
18; 3 Whites Indicted in '57 Black Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1976, at 38; see also John Zenor, Unresolved Death Casts Long Shadow: Despite a Deathbed Confession by One Suspect
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More forcefully, compare the June 29, 1958 bombing of the Bethel

Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama. Initially, Alabama prosecutors offered no indictments. Twenty years later in 1977, prosecutors
indicted white supremacist J. B. Stoner. Alabama state courts
extradited Stoner, convicted him, and sentenced him to ten years."
Turn as well to the 1964 murder of civil rights workers Michael
Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, and James Chaney in Mississippi. The
June 21, 1964 abduction and shooting of the three men resulted in the
FBI arrest of twenty-one Klansmen. When local and state prosecutors

refused to act, federal prosecutors indicted nineteen of the Klansmen
on conspiracy charges. Despite three mistrials, Mississippi courts
convicted only seven Klansmen. Recently, the FBI opened 40,000
pages of investigative
files on the murders, sparking calls for renewed
86
prosecution.

Comparable calls mark the 1965 murder of Oneal Moore, a thirtyfour-year-old black Washington Parish Sheriff Deputy, in Varnado,
Louisiana. On June 2, 1965, Moore was shot and killed in a midnight
ambush while on patrol. Mississippi police arrested Klansman Ray
McElveen. Louisiana prosecutors extradited McElveen and indicted
him for murder but released him within weeks for insufficient
evidence and dropped all charges. The FBI reopened the case in the

1980s, posting a $40,000 reward on January 16, 2002.87
and the Cooperation of Another, an Alabama Man's Family is Waiting for Justice 42 Years
Later, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 4, 1999, at A10; FBI Wants To Know If It Helped Klansman Dodge Murder Charge,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1993, at A13.
85. See Conviction in Bombing in Alabama Is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1982, at 8;
SegregationistGives Up To Serve Bombing Term, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1983, at A16; SegregationistStoner Is Convicted in '58 Bombing and Gets 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1980, at
A20; U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Conviction of White Racist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1985, at
23.
86. See Ben Chancy, Schwerner, Chaney and Goodman: The Struggle for Justice, 27
HUM. RTS. Spring 2000, at 3; see also Kathleen Kenna, Racing Time: State that Once Shielded
the Klan Is Determined To Put It on Trial Before the Last Witnesses Die, TORONTO STAR,
Aug. 27, 2000, at BI; Walter Rugaber, Mississippi Jury Convicts 7 of 18 in Rights Killings,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1967, at 1; Emily Wagster, Next Old Civil Rights Case May Be 'Mississippi Burning' Murders,LETHBRIDGE HERALD, May 3,2001, at A13.
Consider also the July 14, 1964 murder of Henry Hezekiah Dee, a twenty-year-old sawmill worker, and Charles Eddie Moore, a twenty-year-old college student, in Tallulah, Louisiana. Both Dee and Moore vanished on May 2, 1964, though neither was active in the civil
rights movement. A search party found their bodies in a nearby river. In November of 1964,
FBI and state officials arrested two Mississippi Klansmen, Charles M. Edwards and James
Ford Seale, on murder charges. State prosecutors dismissed the charges without convening a
grand jury. In 2002, Mississippi prosecutors and police officials, together with the FBI,
reopened the case for active investigation. See John Herbers, White Man Linked to Slain
Negroes: Alleged Klansman Is Said to Have Admitted Beating of 2 Men Found Dead, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1966, at 1; Whites Freed in Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1965, at 18; 2 Whites
Seized in Negro Slayings: Mississippians Accused of Shooting 2 Hitchhikers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1964, at 56; see also Richard A. Serrano, Chasing Justice in the New South: A Brother
Who Won't Forget, a Prosecutor Who Won't Give Up, L.A. TIMES, June 18,2002, at Al.
87. See Alison Gerber, Prosecutors Reopening Other Decades-Old Cases of Murder,
USA TODAY, May 18, 2000, at A3; Jerry Mitchell, Federal Trial in '66 Killing Likely,
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The same calls for reopening attend the .1967 murder of Ben

Brown in Jackson, Mississippi. On May 11, 1967, Brown was shot in
the back by police officers at a civil rights protest rally. Mississippi
officials conducted a week-long investigation but declined to make
arrests. In 1999, the Jackson Police Department established a Cold
Case Unit to investigate dormant investigations, as yet it has made no
arrests. Calls to reopen the investigation continue to sound even
though the two accused officers are dead.'
Turn more sharply to the 1966 murder of Ben Chester White, a
sixty-seven-year-old farmhand, in Natchez, Mississippi. On June 10,
1966, three Klansmen, Ernest Avants, Claude Fuller, and James Jones,
abducted White, shot him, and dumped his body in Pretty Creek at
Homochitto National Forest. Mississippi officials arrested all three
men. State court proceedings ended in a mistrial for Jones and an
acquittal for Avants. Fuller never stood trial. He and Jones
subsequently died. In 2000, federal prosecutors indicted Avants for

civil rights violations, citing federal jurisdiction over the Homochitto

National Forest.89
Last, turn to the 1970 murder of Rainey Pool, a one-armed sharecropper, in Louise, Mississippi. On April 11, 1970, seven white men
assaulted Pool outside of a Delta nightclub and dumped his body into
the Sunflower River where he died. Prosecutors obtained multiple
indictments in 1970 but declined to go forward. In 1998, at the urging
of Pool's family, prosecutors reopened the case and indicted five of
the seven surviving men on manslaughter charges: James "Doc"
Caston, his brother Charles E. Caston and half-brother Hal Spivey
Crimm, Dennis Newton, and Joe Oliver Watson. At three separate
trials, state courts acquitted Newton but convicted the Caston brothers

CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Jan. 9,2002, at Al; Suzi Parker, In New South, a Bid to
Redress Old Crimes: Today's ProsecutorsRaise the Priority of Unsolved Cases from the Civil
Rights Era, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, June 7,2000, at 1; Paul Rioux, 1965 Murder of Deputy Gets New Look from FBI: Agents Launch 3rd Try to Solve Racial Killing, Ease Family's
Pain, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Louisiana), Aug. 17, 2001, at Al; Stephanie Saul, Their Killers
Walk Free: Because Murder Has No Statute of Limitations, and PoliticalStrength of Black
Voters is Growing, Some Unsolved Killings of Black Men in the Civil Rights Era are Being
Revisited, BALT. SUN, Dec. 20, 1998, at Cl; Richard A. Serrano, ChasingJustice in the New
Soutk Answers Elusive in 1965 Slaying, L.A. TIMES, June 26,2002, at Al; Ed Timms, A New
Climate, a New Callfor Justice, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 1990, at 22.
88. See Adam Lynch, Cold Case Unit Reveals Tactics Involving 1967 Shooting, MISS.
LINK, Feb. 15-21, 2001, at 2.
89. See Rick Bragg, Last Cry for Justice in Mississippi as U.S. Trial Revisits '66 Killing,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, at 1; Jerry Mitchell, Avants' Stroke May Derail Trial: Seventyyear-old Faces Federal Murder Charge in 1966 Case, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.),
Feb. 12, 2002, at B1; Alleged Klansman is Freed in Slaying of Negro; Mississippi Had
Charged That Killing Was Attempt to Lure Dr. King in Murder Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
1967, at 44; Klansmen Linked to Negro's Death; Co-Defendant Asserts Two Killed Mississippian, 65 N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1966, at 20; 3 Men Held in Mississippi on Charge of Killing
Negro, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1966, at 13.
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and Crimm, sentencing each to twenty years in prison. Watson
pleaded guilty?0
Albeit truncated, these case histories demonstrate that the
accepted conception of standard discretion permits prosecutors to
renew race cases in accord with the ethical and jurisprudential norms
of the criminal-justice system. Shorn from liberal legalism, those
norms grant both the independence of lawyers and the autonomy of
law. They also allow a departure from the colorblind stance of impartiality and neutrality toward race. In so doing, they give latitude to
color-coded pretext. Infused by racial-status distinctions and stereotypes, color-coded claims damage the prosecution function as a legal
process and, thereby, weaken both the professional and institutional
values of candor, openness, and fairness. Race-conscious discretion
revives that process, openly conceding the impact of race on lawyer
cognition, epistemology, and ideology, as well as its influence on
sociolegal roles, relationships, and institutions. The candid admission
of race as part of the criminal-justice process leaves race-conscious
discretion untied to restorative justice communities and redemptive
forms of advocacy. The next Part contemplates securing those ties in
the reopening of race cases under the standard ethical conception of
prosecutorial discretion.
III. STANDARD DISCRETION IN RACE CASES

The standard ethical conception for the prosecution of criminal
and civil rights cases rests on discretion. Prosecutorial discretion is
bound up in law, ethics, and tradition.9 The exercise of discretion
underlies prosecutorial decisions to commence, decline, and dismiss
actions in federal and state court. Decisions to abandon and to renew
race case prosecutions incite speculation about state racism and racial
hegemony.92 Such speculation provides ample explanation for prosecu90. See Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 473, 479-82, 503 (Miss. 2002). Compare in this respect
the 1967 murder of Wharlest Jackson, a thirty-seven-year-old NAACP local chapter officer,
in Natchez, Mississippi. On February 27, 1967, Jackson was killed by a truck bomb while
driving home. In spite of a 6,000 page investigative record, the FBI closed the case after the
statute of limitations on civil rights prosecutions expired. In 1998, the Natchez Board of
Alderman issued a resolution urging local police officials to reopen the case. A police review
of the FBI files ensued. See Seth S. King, Slaying Recalls Series of Deaths That Have Marked
Rights Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1968, at 24; Anne Rochell Konigsmark, Civil Wrongs: Pressure Builds to Reopen the Unsolved Murders of Rights Activists in 1960s, ATLANTA J.CONST., Feb. 21, 1999, at Mi.
91. See Richard Bloom, ProsecutorialDiscretion, 87 GEo. L.J. 1267 (1999); Teah R.
Lupton, ProsecutorialDiscretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279 (2002); Robert L. Misner, Recasting
ProsecutorialDiscretion,86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996); Roland G. Schroeder,
ProsecutorialDiscretion,78 GEO. L.J. 853 (1990).
92. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a ConstitutionalState:
Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L. 1 (1998-1999); Laura Kalman, From
Slavery to Freedom, 90 GEO. L.J. 161 (2001); Mark Tushnet, Constructing Paternalist He-
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torial failure and renewal. But the explanation may prove too much.
Its logic merges the prosecutor into the machinery of the state and
immerses professional ideals into racial ideology. That immersion
erases the independent-ethical role of the prosecutor and his autonomous judgment of legality and justice.
Independence aside, prosecutorial judgment in race cases is never
far from bias. Entrenched in the political economy of the state and
circulating across culture and society, bias seeps into the criminaljustice system.93 Prosecutors interpose bias94 in the social construction
of crime." Distinct from the overtness of de jure discrimination, bias
emerges at all phases of criminal justice, extending from street-level
policing to courtroom sentencing.' Pervasive in its reach, it intersects
gender and sexuality.97 Throughout these intersections, it combines
with the intrinsic and extrinsic sources of prosecutorial discretion, particularly legality and justice. Validated by law and custom, bias survives the remedial grassroots and legislative efforts of the twentiethcentury civil rights movement. 98

gemony: Gross, Johnson, and Hadden on Slaves and Masters, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 169
(2002); David Menschel, Note, Abolition Without Deliverance:The Law of Connecticut Slavery 1784-1848, 111 YALE LJ.183 (2001).
93. On the dynamics of bias, see Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding
of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes,74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001).
94. On prosecutor bias in the social construction of crime, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1739 (1993), and Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988).
See also W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981).
95. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT - RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN

AMERICA (1995); Paul G. Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante's Inferno and the Social Construction of Crime, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 787 (2001); Paul Knepper, Race, Racism and Crime Statistics,24 S.U. L. REV. 71 (1996).

96. See Thorne Clark, Protectionfrom Protection:Section 1983 and the ADA's Implications for Devising a Race-Conscious Police Misconduct Statute, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1585
(2002); Kathryn Roe Eldridge, Racial Disparities in the Capital System: Invidious or Accidental, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2002); Marvin D. Free, Jr., Race and PresentencingDecisions in
the United States: A Summary and Critique of the Research, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 203 (2002).
97. See Serena Mayeri, "A Common Fate of Discrimination":Race-Gender Analogies in
Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111
YALE LJ.769, 875-925 (2002).
9& See Jack M. Beerman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation: Fifty Years
Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981 (2002); Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes-InterestConvergence and Civil Rights Gains,37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 369 (2002).
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A. StandardDiscretion: Intrinsic Sources
Standard discretion defines the prosecution function as a means to
enforce law and to promote justice." Fastening legality to justice
establishes the moral predicate for the criminal-justice system.
Moreover, it confirms the logic and legitimacy of that system.
Abraded by bias, the link between law and justice erodes in race cases.
The sometimes prejudicial interests clamoring for criminal justice cause-oriented groups, political parties, the media, and the public speed that erosion.
The history, organization, and adversary setting of criminal and
civil rights prosecutions direct prosecutorial decisionmaking in serving
the multiple interests of private parties and public agents." Critical
moments of decision come in investigating, charging, and plea
bargaining.'' Efforts to guide such discretionary moments by
prudence, truth, or virtue 2 struggle to overcome racial bias.'03
Comparable efforts grounded in administrative, doctrinal, and ethical
regulation also falter."°

99. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 607 (1999); Judith L. Maute, "In Pursuitof Justice" in High Profile Criminal Maters, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1745 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial
Trial Practice:Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991).
100. See Bruce A. Green, The Ethical Prosecutorand the Adversary System, 24 CRIM. L.
BULL. 126 (1988); David T. Johnson, The Organizationof Prosecution and the Possibility of
Order, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 247 (1998); Kenneth J. Melilli, ProsecutorialDiscretion in an
Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 669 (1992); Alan Vinegrad, The Role of the Prosecutor:
Serving the Interests of All the People, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 895 (2000); Joan E. Jacoby, The
American Prosecutorin HistoricalContext, PROSECUTOR, MaylJune 1997, at 33.
101. See ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA (1981); Eli Paul Mazur, Rational Expectations of Leniency: Implicit Plea Agreements and the Prosecutor'sRole as a Minister of Justice, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1333 (2002); Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial
ChargingDecisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion- Knowing There Will Be
Consequencesfor Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371 (2000); Lisa F. Salvatore, United
States v. Hammad: Encouraging Ethical Conduct of Prosecutors During Pre-Indictment Investigations,56 BROOK. L. REV. 577 (1990).
102. See Darryl K. Brown, What Virtue Ethics Can Do for CriminalJustice: A Reply To
Huigens, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 29 (2002); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous
Prosecutor:A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197 (1988); Bennett L. Gershman,
The Prosecutor'sDuty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309 (2001); Leslie C. Griffin, The
Prudent Prosecutor,14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259 (2001); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good
Person and a Good Prosecutor?,14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355 (2001).
103. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecutionand Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998); Tracey L. McCain, The Interplay of Editorialand Prosecutorial Discretionin the Perpetuationof Racism in the CriminalJustice System, 25 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 601 (1992).
104. See Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon:An Administrative
Law for ProsecutorialDecision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473 (1976); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethicsfor Prosecutorsand Trial CourtJudges,73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475 (1998);
Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutorsin Discretionary Decisions,
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Ethical restraints on bias are thwarted by the enabling discretion of
law and community."0 5 Law divulges bias via custom and text. Custom
permits bias through habits and practices. Texts - constitutional,
statutory, and common law - authorize bias through their plain
meaning, legislative history, policy, and precedent. In race cases,
prosecutors apply constitutional and statutory texts in accord with the
racial customs of their office and locality.
Community instills bias by direct and indirect pressure. Direct
pressure follows from the prosecutorial-appointment process.
Appointed by election or merit selection, prosecutors periodically
must offer their policies and records up for popular or state ratification. That occasion serves as a kind of public referendum, a plebiscite
on the juridical rules of race. Indirect pressure flows from cultural and
social conventions. Cultural conventions embodied in prosecutor
charging and jury deliberation decide on the suitability of black
victims for trial and the patience of black communities to endure
prosecutorial inaction and failure. Matching social conventions decree
the availability of white offenders for trial and the willingness of white
communities to accommodate the strife of trial without political intervention. For decades, law and community combined to stifle the
prosecution of race cases and to quiet outcry when that prosecution
failed.
For contemporary prosecutors, especially at the federal level,"°
criminal and civil rights law and community fervor are no longer
freighted with the same weight of nineteenth-century bias. Less
encumbered by the racially inflammatory texts of law and the prejudicial onus of cultural and social convention, they enjoy expanded
discretion under augmented federal criminal laws"° and federal sen-

68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000); N. Douglas Wells, Prosecutionas an Administrative System: Some FairnessConcerns, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 841 (1999).
105, See Peter Krug, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National
Reports to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section V Prosecutorial
Discretionand its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643 (2002); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint
of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981); James Vorenberg, Narrowing the
Discretionof CriminalJustice Officials, 4 DUKE L.J. 651 (1976).
106. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics,
55 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors,88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000); see also Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming
Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2002); Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the
Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553
(1999).
107. See AMER. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW 32-35 (1998); Steven W. Clymer, UnequalJustice: The Federalizationof Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L REV. 643,675-97 (1997); Symposium, Federalizationof Crime: The Role
of the Federaland State Governments in the CriminalJustice System, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 965

(1995).
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tencing guidelines.108 The still developing body of procedural law

implementing these

federal criminal

statutes

seems similarly

unhindered by brazenly asserted bias, though controversy afflicts the
burdens of procedure, specifically the judge-made evidentiary barriers
to selective prosecution claims," 9 Paradoxically, by enlarging the
prosecutorial range of discretion in case selection, sentencing departures, and penalty enhancement, these burgeoning statutes offer
greater opportunity for bias."
Lacking the civil rights-era insulation afforded by state law
enforcement officials and the massive resistance of local white
communities, contemporary prosecutors seem more prone to hear
complaints of inaction and to suffer the inferences of bias-related
misconduct."' The constitutional repercussions of misconduct charges
ignite debate over professional discipline and the abuse of ethical
rules." 2 Now, as before, charges of prosecutorial bias rarely address
the source of the bias itself.
Bias originates in community. The cohesion and vitality of
community hinge on values. Segregated community is founded on the
values of white superiority and domination. Rooted in segregated

108. See Cynthia K. Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal
Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
199 (1997); William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 373
(1995); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1471 (1993).
109. See Marc Michael, Note, United States v. Armstrong: Selective Prosecution - A
Futile Defense and Its Arduous Standard of Discovery, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (1998);
Tobin Romero, Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: Fulfilling the Promise of
Equal Justice, 84 GEO. L.J. 2043 (1996).
110. See G. Robert Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised Constitutional Theory or New Congressional Statutes, But the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutive
Discretion, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1995); Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution
and the Federalizationof Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1325-44 (1997); Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A.
Bohrer, Checking the Balance: ProsecutorialPower in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137 (1995).
111. John M. Burkoff, ProsecutorialEthics: The Duty Not "To Strike Foul Blows", 53 U.
PITT. L. REV. 271, 282 (1992); Peter J. Henning, ProsecutorialMisconduct in GrandJury Investigations, 51 S.C. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1999); see Andrew M. Hertherington, Prosecutorial
Misconduct,90 GEO. L.J. 1679 (2002).
112. See Jennifer Blair, Comment, The Regulation of Federal ProsecutorialMisconduct
by State Bar Associations: 28 U.S.C. § 530B and the Reality of Inaction, 49 UCLA L. REV.
625 (2001); Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, A Bludgeon by Any Other Name: The Misuse of "Ethical
Rules" Against Prosecutors to Control the Law of the State, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 665,
687-90 (1996); Peter J. Henning, ProsecutorialMisconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 713 (1999); Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and
Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence,71 TEMP. L. REV. 887 (1998);
Fred C. Zacharias, The ProfessionalDiscipline of Prosecutors,79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001);
see also Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment,
113 HARV. L. REV. 2080 (2000).
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community, both northern and southern prosecutors fell subject to
white racial ideology. Nothing in the prosecutorial office granted
immunity from its malevolence. But lack of immunity alone scarcely
explains prosecutorial inaction and failure in the instant race cases.
Fuller explanation of prosecutorial breakdown points to the discretionary calculus of instrumental lawyering.
Instrumental theories animate the prosecution and defense functions. Value-laden in design, instrumental lawyering is purposive. The
purposes encompass broad and narrow goals. Result-oriented in style,
such lawyering seeks certain outcomes. The outcomes arise in single
cases or along a continuum of cases. This consequentialist ethic
extends to case selection and trial strategy.
The freedom to exert autonomy in case selection and strategy
distinguishes prosecutors from other state agents. To borrow from
William Simon's prior writing on ethical discretion elsewhere in
lawyering, the freedom to pursue "potentially enforceable legal
claims" and "to refuse to assist in the pursuit of legally permissible3
courses of action" puts prosecutors at some distance from the state."
Distance of this sort is significant. It implies discretion and political
room to maneuver. Variation in the degree of distance from state
authority delimits the ambit of discretion available to prosecutors.
However narrow, that ambit reserves the inchoate redemptive opportunity to advance legality and justice in the prosecution of race cases.
The prospect for redemptive prosecution in race cases rises from
reflection. Prosecutorial discretion carries what Simon calls "a professional duty of reflective judgment.""' 4 Reflection involves an assessment of the relative merits of the state's criminal-justice goals and
claims. For the cases assembled here, the goals include conciliation,
integration, and segregation. The claims sound colorblind, colorcoded, or color-conscious themes.
Both state goals and claims entail conflicting considerations of
criminal justice. The considerations favor different groups and outcomes. Conciliation goals encourage face-to-face meeting and forgiveness. Integration goals promote gradual cooperation and mercy.
Segregation goals foster separation and reprisal. Tilted toward integration, colorblind claims grope to obtain incremental changes in intergroup relations. Covertly joined with racial partition, color-coded
claims work to preserve unequal relations. Openly revisionist, colorconscious claims alternately serve to realign and retrench intergroup
positions.
Prosecutorial reconciliation of the competing merits of criminaljustice goals and claims requires a sense of legality and justice
113. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1083 (1988).
114. Id.
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independent of state sanction. Professional independence from the
client, the market, and the state comports with Simon's sense of the
"traditional ambitions of lawyers.""' For Simon, realizing that ambition demands direct-lawyer participation in relevant decisionmaking,
not unreflective acquiescence to the commands of vigilante mobs or
partisan officials. Such participation, uninhibited by offender
bargaining, victim preference, or state prerogative, involves a prosecutor-initiated process of elaborating and implementing norms of
legality and justice. To be helpful, elaboration must go outside the traditional law of race and the entailment of de jure and de facto
discrimination. Deploying countervailing constitutional, statutory, and
common law resources, it must aspire to restore community and to
reconcile conflict. In the same way, implementation must go beyond
customary-legal remedy to fashion equitable, community-based relief.
The starting point for the vindication of the norms of legal merit
and justice in race cases is the particularized circumstance of the
victim, the offender, and their cohort communities. Promoting justice
in these difficult circumstances urges the embrace of the discretionary
norms applied in judicial decisionmaking. The analogy to judicial
decisionmaking in lawyering is not uncommon." 6 Building on this
analogy, Simon recommends judge-made norms for their analytic
breadth, flexibility, and complexity." 7
Unlike the instrumentalist emphasis on lawyering goals and claims,
the formalist style of judicial decisionmaking stresses relative and
internal merit. Applied to the prosecution of race cases, relative merit
comprises three measures: law, interest, and equality. The first tests
the legal underpinnings of prosecutorial goals and claims against
governing constitutional, statutory, and common law standards in
search of accord and, when unavailing, reform. The second appraises
the quality of the public and private interests embedded in prosecutorial goals and claims, a measure that admittedly may prove unquantifiable. The third estimates the remedial impact of asserted prosecutorial goals and claims on political and social inequality. Simon refers
to this impact as a kind of equalization effect, more pertinent to legal
services access than political or socioeconomic status.'"8 Conceptually,
it bears noting that equalization possesses enough dexterity to address
both racial access to justice in law and racial equality in society.
Unquestionably, Simon's proposed measures of relative merit pose
difficulties. Law is far too indeterminate and its policies too often
115. Id. at 1144.
116. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993).
117. See Simon, supra note 113, at 1090-91.
118. Id. at 1093.
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incommensurate to resolve merit by force of will. Even edicts carrying
the force of law may still not cure ancient nonconformity, as shown in
the repeated frustration of Reconstruction and post-Brown era statutory and constitutional decrees. Interest analysis is also suspect. Public
and private interests frequently stand incompatible. State, offender,
and victim interests similarly diverge. Remedial solutions enamored
of equality also generate uncertainty. Equality remedies spawn
incalculable effects, sometimes recasting the very form and substance
of discrimination, for example in the criminal context of jury selection
where tolerance for race-based peremptory challenges continues to
survive judicial scrutiny." 9 Such secondary and often unforeseeable
effects may contravene the purpose of the remedy itself.
Faced with compound indeterminacies in assaying the relative
merit of state criminal-justice goals and claims, prosecutors must turn
to an inspection of internal merit in race cases. To Simon, internal
merit dictates an assessment of legal value. This valuation consists of
three parts."0 The first part evaluates the substance and procedure of
the appointed goals and claims. The substantive and procedural goals
of race cases relate to the formal protection and vindication of
communities of color under criminal and civil rights statutes. The
second part assesses the purpose and form of state goals and claims.
The redemptive purposes of race cases fracture upon entering the
criminal-justice system where adversarial and penal conventions
thwart restorative-justice goals. The third part contemplates the
framing of state goals and claims in broad and narrow terms. The
framing of race cases adverts broadly to black and white community,
but refers narrowly to the offender and victim.
Prosecutor appraisal of the relative and internal merit of state
criminal-justice goals and claims in race cases gathers consequence
when state decisionmakers in law enforcement locales, legislatures,
and courts abdicate responsibility for guaranteeing equal protection
and due process rights to communities of color. In these circumstances, as here, state decisionmakers fall unreliable. Doubtless the
logic of collective action, coupled with federalism and separation of
powers principles, urges fairly apportioning responsibility to multiplestate decisionmakers in race cases. Evidence of institutional bias,
however, behooves prosecutors to lead the decisionmaking process in
establishing and implementing controverted state goals in race cases.
Prosecutorial leadership in race cases requires a role-situated
brand of self-appraisal tailored to the exercise of discretion. To be
useful, lawyer self-appraisal must set out a manageable and reliable
decisionmaking procedure. Indicated by Simon, self-appraisal gives

119. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
120. Simon, supra note 113, at 1096-109.
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rise to a heightened duty to assure a sound procedure for the formulation of state criminal-justice goals and claims. Soundness implies efficacy in intervention. Embellishing Simon, this process imperative
reinforces the prosecutor's ordinary duty to take "reasonably available
actions to make the procedure as effective as possible and to forgo
actions that would reduce its efficacy."'' Implying an efficacy principle militates against prosecutor dissonance and deception in pursuing
state goals.
The interventionist duty to formulate a decision procedure
demands close attention to the purpose and form of prosecution.
Mainstream purposes well-matched to community wants channel
prosecutors to abide by formal procedure. Reformist purposes,
discordant with community desires, leave prosecutors unguided by
traditional procedure. The burden of unguided discretion accentuates
the complex procedural judgments and responsibilities prosecutors
undertake in assuring substantively valid decisions in race cases.
Prosecutorial judgments of purpose and form may be aided by
reframing state criminal-justice goals and claims. Reframing entails
the deployment of broad and narrow issue templates. Narrow
templates, Simon explains, define issues "in terms of a small number
of characteristics of the parties and their dispute," for example, in a
white-on-black crime of assault or murder. 22 Broad templates define
issues "to encompass the parties' identities, relationship, and social
circumstances[,]" for example, in a race-infected hate crime offense.' 2
For utility, the templates must correspond to the facts and issues in
controversy. Simon posits certain general standards of relevance to
guide the process of framing. 24
Of these standards, the first is interpretive plausibility. Plausibility
in the interpretation of law and fact in race cases is battered by lasting
antebellum legal privilege and evidentiary presumption. White
privilege, with its deep-seated bias, may mislead law. At the same
time, presumptive white credibility may undermine fact.
The second standard of relevance is practical impact. The salutary
impact of reopening race cases on criminal and civil rights law,
community, and inequality is unsure. If the cases flourish, legislatures
may curtail the scope of applicable law. Judges may also ration its use.
Even communities may resent its imposition. Meanwhile, inequality
may prosper with its political and economic undercarriage intact.
The third standard of relevance is knowledge. Prosecutor knowledge of the issues in race cases is ostensibly confined to the sphere of
121. Id. at 1100.
122. Id.at 1107.
123.

1i.

124. Id.

at 1107-08.
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criminal justice. Although triggered by crime, race cases develop out
of conditions of political powerlessness and socioeconomic inequality.
At bottom, the cases deal with discrimination shrouded in violence.
Outside of the criminal-justice system, prosecutors' knowledge of
discrimination and its repercussions for communities of color is often
meager."'
The fourth standard of relevance is institutional competence.
Prosecutors in race cases possess the competence to investigate and
indict white lawbreakers. Bolstered by courts, they join in the conduct
of trials and negotiation of sentences. But their powers of penalty
assignment and remedial monitoring are secondary to law enforcement officials and managerial judges. Ill-equipped for relief-giving
duties, prosecutors flounder outside their ken.
Reframing state criminal-justice goals and claims in accordance
with general standards of relevance is likely to narrow prosecutorial
judgments of purpose and form in race cases. For prosecutors, interpretive plausibility may prove too attenuated and practical impact too
paltry. Absent sufficient knowledge and institutional competence to
mobilize a broader political-legal reform strategy, they may submit
their judgments to the prosecution of discrete, disaggregated cases. In
this surprising way, Simon's proffered bundle of standards help frame
the relevant purpose and form of prosecutions in race cases.
The intrinsic sources of legality and justice entwined in the
calibrations of relative and internal merit lay down the normative
foundation for prosecutorial discretion. That foundation is buttressed
by the values of autonomy and good faith in decisionmaking. Race
cases confront prosecutors with conflicting state and community
commitments to legality and justice. The collision of prosecutor, state,
and community norms calls for autonomy.
Prosecutorial autonomy takes two forms: conciliation and independence. Conciliation drives the prosecutor to find grounds for
community agreement over racially revisionist state criminal-justice
goals and claims. The agreement may come from republican dialogue
and deliberation or from a shared vision of the common good. As the
instant cases show, racial animus may prevent such agreement. It may
hamper dialogue and disrupt deliberation. And it may preclude
consensus over the selection and implementation of state ends.
Independence prods the prosecutor to overcome racial discontinuity in state commitments to legality and justice by returning to the
legal values of internal merit. These values underscore the importance
of independent community-oriented goal and claim selection. To an
125. The community prosecution movement signals the gradual rectification of the extra-judicial neglect of race. See Jana Sorensen, Slums: A Dirty Shame, PROSECUTOR,
Mar./Apr. 2001, at 34; Rita Spillane, Community Prosecutors as Pioneers, PROSECUTOR,
Nov./Dec. 2002, at 34.
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extent, that professional conviction is weakened by the prosecutor's
own counterposing pledge to effect state-certified values and outcomes, however bigoted and inequitable. Ascertaining community
goals in race cases without the coincidence of prosecutor-state normative commitments requires reasoned and inclusive deliberation with
both black and white communities.
Community deliberation over the place of color in the prosecution
of race cases makes no promise of consensus. In fact, to engage in such
extra-state deliberation, prosecutors must adopt a denaturalized view
of consensus that concedes the normal suppression of minority voices.
Problematizing the notion of consensus in this way uncloaks prosecutor tendencies towards coercion and exclusion. Exposing coercion and
acknowledging exclusion in the traditional model of discretionary
decisionmaking makes little progress toward prosecutor-community
goal consensus or coincidence. But finding coherence and compatibility may be futile. Condemned to futility, prosecutors must nevertheless seek at least some sense of community confirmation or assent.
The risk in seeking out such express or implied consent lies in prosecutorial overreaching. 26 Deprived of intrinsic sources to curb overreaching and its unfettered discretion, prosecutors must rely on
extrinsic sources of authority to guide their discretion. 7
B.

StandardDiscretion: Extrinsic Sources

Extrinsic sources of discretion restrain and embolden the reprosecution of race cases. These sources derive from ethics rules, constitutional values, and community norms. Collectively, they shape the
prosecution function alternately into an instrument of racial emancipation and subordination. That instrumental function is exemplified
by the charging decision. The contested site of conscious and unconscious racism, charging constitutes an act of naming. The naming of a
white offender and a black victim in race cases signifies prosecutorial
freedom from the antebellum state and Jim Crow culture and society.
The main source of extrinsic discretion comes from governing
ethics rules and standards. Promulgated by federal and state bar associations, 2 ' national advisory groups,'29 and governmental agencies,"3

126. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001).
127. For a more sympathetic account of intrinsic sources, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2620-36 (1993) [hereinafter Alfieri, Impoverished
Practices].
128. See AMER. BAR ASS'N MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1983); AMER.
BAR ASS'N MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2001); AMER. BAR ASS'N STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1993).
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and ratified by court enforcement, the rules and standards regulate
prosecutorial power in charging, investigation, plea bargaining, trial
practice, and sentencing.' 31 Regulation retreats from larger issues of
adversary justice and institutional incentive. 32 It prefers instead to
address matters of conflict, impropriety, and discipline. 33 Discussion

of these interstitial matters normally omits mention of racial identity
and a racialized narrative. Even in the context of race cases, discussion
routinely holds tightly to the position of neutrality. Tied to an adversarial ethic, that position espouses the norms of partisanship and
moral nonaccountability.
Although stripped of moral accountability and express racial
purpose, bar rules early established the prosecutorial duty to see that
justice is done. Initially proclaimed under the American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, that public duty
condemns fact suppression and witness tampering." The ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct reiterate the prosecutorial responsibility to serve as a minister of justice. 35 Likewise, the ABA Standards for

Criminal Justice reaffirm the prosecutorial obligation to seek justice

rather than merely convict.'3 6 The Standards assign the prosecutor the
129. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 97, 99,
109, 112, 123 (2000); NAT'L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS (2d ed. 1991).

130. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL
(1997) (enumerating principles of federal prosecution).

§§

9-27.000 to .745

131. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and FederalProsecutors:
The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291
(1992); Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the
Non-Adversarial Roles of FederalProsecutors,37 B.C. L. REV. 923 (1996); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining:The Control of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 1983
U. ILL. L. REV. 37; Judy Platania & Gary Moran, Due Processand the Death Penalty: The
Role of ProsecutorialMisconduct in Closing Argument in Capital Trials, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 471 (1999).
132 See H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF

CRIME IN AMERICA (1996); Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial": When ProsecutorsKeep
Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1996); Catherine FergusonGilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss
Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283 (2001);
Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing ProsecutorialDiscretion and
Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995).
133. See Susan W. Brenner & James Geoffrey Durham, Towards Resolving Prosecutor
Conflicts of Interest, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415, 468-83 (1993); Roberta K. Flowers, What
You See is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors,
63 MO. L. REV. 699 (1998); Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors:Do Too Many
Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69 (1995); Fred C.
Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutorsor, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?:Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (1996).
134. See AMER. BAR ASS'N CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 5 (1908).
135. See AMER. BAR ASS'N MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt (2003).
136. See AMER. BAR ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-1.2(c)
(1993).
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critical, quasi-judicial role of justice administrator. Entrusting him to
pursue the interests of justice with broad discretionary powers, the
urge the prosecutor to elevate the quality of criminal jusStandards
13 7
tice.
The elevation of criminal justice to a higher standard of public
ministration comports with the specific mandates of prevailing ethics
rules. 3' These rules issue four chief mandates: evidentiary burdens,
the rights of the accused, the defender lawyer-client relationship, and
trial-associated publicity. To discharge his evidentiary burdens, the
prosecutor must marshal probable cause in support of the charging
decision and make timely disclosure of evidence relevant to guilt and
sentencing. To safeguard the accused, he must honor the right to
obtain counsel and strive to prevent the unknowing waiver of pretrial
rights. To preserve the defender lawyer-client relationship and the
integrity of the adversary system, he must reign in the intrusions of
lawyer-targeted subpoena power. To avert the prejudicial impact of
pretrial and trial publicity, he must limit the extra-judicial statements
of subordinates and refrain from illegitimate extra-judicial comments
likely to arouse public condemnation of the accused.'39
Conferring the role of justice minister, these rule-issued mandates
recognize the influence wielded by prosecutors in race cases. Bestowed
as an institutional prerogative, that influence extends to charging,
discovery, pretrial motions, trial practice, and sentencing. Each component of practice corresponds to a differential form of discretion. And
each risks the repetition of an essentializing construction of race in the
cloak of victim and community inferiority. Cloaking victims and communities of color in antebellum stigma is an act of normative privileging.
That act forsakes the victim. Equally important, it severs the redemptive
obligations of the offender.
Shielding the victim from denigrating stigma and sparing the
offender from undeserved retaliation in race cases prod prosecutors to
draw upon a second extrinsic source of authority, bound up in the
constitutional values of due process and equal protection." Exalted in

137. See id. at Standard 3-1.2(d) cmt.
138. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory,
Practice,and the Paradigmof ProsecutorialEthics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 (1993).
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a)-(f) cmt; see also AMER. BAR
ASS'N MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A)-(B) (1982); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor,the Press,and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865 (1990).
140. See Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the
Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279 (2001); Michael T.
Fisher, Harmless Error, ProsecutorialMisconduct, and Due Process: There's More to Due
Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298 (1988); Donald G. Gifford, Equal
Protection and the Prosecutor'sCharging Decision: Enforcing an Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 659 (1981); Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in TwentiethCentury Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923 (2000).
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the moral structure of the Constitution, these procedural and egalitarian norms unleash, and provide a bulwark against, prosecutorial

incursions under the banner of state-law enforcement. The thrust of
state criminal enforcement actions, however, oftentimes overwhelms
procedural fortifications. Indeed, when carelessly planned, the incursions quickly threaten to trample the dignitary interests of the victim
and the equality interests of the offender. Dignitary interests concern
self-worth and social value. Equality interests pertain to evenhanded
treatment. For black victims, dignity is endangered by wounding
treatment of the black body caused by prosecutor, jury, and public
denigration. 4' For white offenders, equality is imperiled by double

jeopardy 42 and speedy trial infractions. 43

Constitutional norms of dignity and equality are realized during the
investigation and trial of race cases. The investigation of racially motivated violence summons the managerial role of the prosecutor in
supervising local law enforcement. That institutional role requires the
fair-minded supervision of law enforcement officials in targeting, apprehending, and interrogating suspects.
The trial of racial violence calls upon the educational role of the

prosecutor in teaching the offender, jury, and community about the
experience of violence and its manifold harm. Teaching harm to a
segregated community inhabited by the offender and victim demands the
abnegation of natural and scientific claims of racial inferiority.,' It also
compels the disavowal of the virtues of separatism.

141. See JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 81-114 (1997); Kevin Brown, The Social
Constructionof a Rape Victim: Stories of African-American Males About the Rape of Desiree
Washington, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 997; Ariela Gross, Pandora's Box: Slave Character on
Trial in the Antebellum Deep South, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 267 (1995); Lawrence Vogelman, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King Trial and the Use of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom,20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571 (1993).
142. For useful discussions of double jeopardy in successive state-federal prosecutions,
see Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King,
and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609 (1994), and Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy Wars:
The Case for a Civil Rights "Exception," 41 UCLA L. REV. 649 (1994). See also Kenneth
Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an
Emerging Jurisprudence,71 TEMP. L. REV. 887 (1998).
143. Speedy trial safeguards emanate from both constitutional and statutory sources,
including the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Sixth
Amendment, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, VI, & XIV; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b)
& 50(b). On speedy trial principles, see Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword, Sixth Amendment
First Principles,84 GEO. L.J. 641,649-77 (1996), and George C. Thomas, III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrectingthe Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure,100
MICH. L. REV. 145, 228-31 (2001). See also Peter Applebome, Mississippi Hearing in Evers
Slaying Pits Trial Rights against Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, at A18.
144. See Frank Dikotter, Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics,
103 AM. HiST. REV. 467 (1998).
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Teachings of moral import point to a third extrinsic source of discretion in the guise of community. In race cases, the cardinal values of the
criminal-justice system - retribution and redemption - stem from
community norms. Stirred by vengeance, retribution entails punishment.
Inspired by mercy, redemption entails penitence and forgiveness. Both
victim-centered vengeance and offender-centered redemption reflect the
character and custom of a community. Race-tom communities are likely
to be the custodians of antebellum character and segregated custom.
Their custodial stake in violence is inimical to the prosecutorial
commitment to interracial justice. That stake may be unyielding. It may
rebuff appeals to criminal justice, public welfare, and constitutional
value. It may refuse to treat violence as a collective injury. And it may
reject the role of prosecutor as the trustee of the common good. 45
Founded on social contract theory, the prosecutor-trustee role
requires institutional deference by offender and victim alike. It also
necessitates interracial reciprocity by offender and victim support groups
and their communities. Deference highlights the intrinsic sources of
prosecutorial discretion. It leaves the judgments of legality and justice to
the prosecutor. Reciprocity underscores the extrinsic sources of prosecutorial discretion. It hinges on the outside judgments of ethical
concurrence, constitutional valuation, and community conviction. 4
Together, deference and reciprocity transform the prosecutorial
role. That transformation invigorates the redemptive aspect of the
prosecutorial function. Employed as state agents of redemption,
prosecutors stand free to enunciate the norms of penitence, forgiveness, and mercy. However alluring, their newfound theology of healing founders in race cases. Although deduced from intrinsic and extrinsic sources of prosecutorial discretion, it fails to install a racial
compass to guide discretion in the use of colorblind, color-coded, and
color-conscious modes of analysis. The next Part elucidates the
distinctions of color consciousness in prosecutorial discretion.
IV. RACE-CONSCIOUS DISCRETION

The notion of race-conscious discretion offers an alternative justification for the resurgent prosecution of white-on-black racial
violence. Extracted from the normative foundation established by
standard discretion, the notion of race-conscious prosecutorial discretion holds a shared commitment to legality and justice. It bolsters that
commitment by like reference to ethics, constitutional values, and
community norms. Despite these common intrinsic and extrinsic
145, See Elisa E. Ugarte, The Government Lawyer and the Common Good, 40 S. TEX.
L. REV. 269,274-78 (1999).
146. For an earlier account of prosecutor roles, see Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, supra note 1,at 831-49.
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origins, standard and race-conscious forms of discretion differ. The
crux of the difference lies in adversarial faith.
Standard discretion posits a misplaced faith in the adversary system. Modernist rather than absolutist in tone, that faith concedes incidental and systemic error. Incidental errors are performative. They
point to deficiencies in the performance of law enforcement, advocacy,
and adjudication functions. The deficiencies are treated as isolated
and ephemeral. Even when obdurate, they are deemed susceptible to
individual correction. In contrast, systemic errors disclose deficiencies
in the basic structure of law enforcement, advocacy, and adjudication.
The deficiencies are recurrent and intractable. Impervious to change,
they withstand individual and institutional remedy.
The acknowledgement of incidental and systemic error within the
adversary system of criminal justice overlooks the virulence of race.
This oversight is endemic to the standard conception. To overlook
race is not to deny it. Prosecutors guided by standard discretion admit
to race in the profiling of offenders, in the selection of jurors and jury
pools, and in shopping for judges. They also admit to race in the narrative texts of their opening statements, closing arguments, and pretrial
comments. Yet, these admissions are blind to color in its full normative and social meaning.
The institutional faith of standard discretion emanates from
suppression. Standard discretion suppresses the normative consequence of coloring identity and narrative, and the social significance of
coloring advocacy. Part of the explanation for this suppression
pertains to the individualistic content of the criminal law and the
adversary system. The criminal law principally contemplates solitary
wrongdoing. The adversary system primarily addresses individual lawbreakers. Neither focuses on community transgression and collective
responsibility for lawbreaking. 47
Additionally, part of the explanation for the suppression of color
relates to the neutral pretense of the ethical canons of the legal profession. The pretense of neutrality is inextricably linked to partisanship
and moral nonaccountability. Partisanship veils colored discourse in
the ethos of adversarialism. Moral nonaccountability excuses it inside
and outside the domain of law. Repeated evidence of this pretense is
discoverable in the norms and meanings of racial discourse in the
criminal-justice system. Routinely heard among prosecutors, and
echoed among lawyer defenders, judges, and law enforcement agents,
that discourse approves distinct modes of colorblind, color-coded, and
color-conscious representation. However biased in content and
147. On collective guilt and responsibility for community transgression, see Sanford
Cloud Jr., The Next Bold Step Toward Racial Healing and Reconciliation: Dealing with the
Legacy of Slavery, 45 HOw. L.J. 157 (2001), and George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures:
Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002).
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discriminatory in effect, none, of these narrative modes apparently
departs from neutrality. Evidently, they are merely partisan. At worst,
they are overzealous. More important, none of the modes is presumed
to be adverse to identity or inimical to community.
Rhetorical approval or disapproval of the trope of color signals
competing public commitments to racial identity and status in law and
society. Historical crimes of white-on-black racial violence give prosecutors the opportunity to realize their commitments to color in the
ongoing decisions of criminal advocacy. The vectors of punishment
and mercy form a basic dyad of commitment for the prosecutor in his
public role of crime-fighting sentinel and criminal-justice minister.
Fulfilling that dual role in a redemptive spirit of conciliation may
prove beneficial to the struggle for interracial community justice. But
it may invite the popular condemnation of victim and offender groups.
No offender or victim - white or black - stands alone apart from
his identity-based community. Materially, each comes from situated
family and community circumstances. Symbolically, each reflects the
character of that original community, either in a discrete feature or in
a multiplicity of traits. At all times, each offender and victim belongs
to a specific group or a collection of community groups. Ordinarily
consigned to colorblind or color-coded adversarial conflict, those
groups may collide differently in a move to race-conscious, redemptive
prosecution.
Faced with white-on-black violence, black-victim groups may look
to race-conscious, redemptive prosecutions on egalitarian grounds,
demanding equal punishment for white lawbreakers. White offender
groups may view the same prosecutions on procedural grounds,
insisting on the protection of due process safeguards for lawbreakers.
The clash of state-sponsored restorative conciliation, victim-implored
instrumental vengeance, and unrepentant offender-pleaded procedural formalism is the paradox of racially redemptive prosecution in
the adversary context of retributive punishment. That clash indicates
that race-conscious, redemptive bids for interracial reconciliation may
be incompatible with the reprisal norms of adversarial justice. It also
suggests that such bids may be incongruent with community sentiment, insofar as community may be said to exist in a racially polarized
state.
The liberal imagination, beset by a plural tolerance for divided
community, offers little chance of resolving this central paradox of
race-conscious, redemptive prosecution. Closely tied to the rational
individualism of adversarial contest, liberalism holds limited tools
from which to build a legal process of racial conciliation. Individualism
strains to engage in the dialogue and other-directed empathy required
for reconciliation. Tolerance prefers the passivity of secular forbearance to the affirmative, identity-imbued clasp of reconciliation.
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Pluralism endorses a weak sense of community best defined by competition rather than cooperative consensus.
The atomized fellowship, meek tolerance, and thin consensus of
liberal community are further undermined by critical race jurisprudence. Critical race theorists castigate liberal tolerance for its
repression of diversity. They also rebuke liberal consensus for manufacturing a false civic accord. Solicitous of intersectional color and its
promise of common fellowship, they call for a more inclusive tolerance
and a more genuine consensus across racial lines traditionally dividing
African-American, Latino/a, Asian, and Native-American communities.
Race-conscious, redemptive discretion joins liberal and critical

race jurisprudence in reconstructing the adversarial model of prosecution. Both liberal and critical race scholars point to pervasive evidence

of race discrimination in law and society."

In the criminal-justice

setting, scholars observe patterns of disparity binding race, crime, and
criminal justice. 4 9 The patterns surface in prosecutorial charging 5 ' and
court sentencing. 5 ' Their repercussions materialize in accusations of
selective prosecution'
and in damage to black communities.'53
148. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001);' CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE - A QUESTION OF COLOR (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Burdens and Benefits of Race in America, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219 (1998).
149. See BENJAMIN BOWLING & CORETrA PHILLIPS, RACISM, CRIME AND JUSTICE
(2002); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); SAMUEL WALKER ET
AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2000);
RACE, ETHNICITY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, VIOLENT CRIME: THE REALITIES AND THE
MYTHS (Nathaniel J. Pallone ed., 2000); Richard R. W. Brooks, Fearand Fairnessin the City:
Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairnessin Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1219 (2000); Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the CriminalJustice System,
94 MICH. L. REV. 1660 (1996); Anna Wang, Beyond Black and White: Crime and Foreignness in the News, 8 ASIAN L.J. 187 (2001).
150. See Amy Grossman Applegate, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Discriminationin the
Decision to Charge, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 35 (1982); Raymond Paternoster, ProsecutorialDiscretion in Requesting the Death Penalty:A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination,18 LAW
& SOCY REV. 437 (1984); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial
Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 587 (1985); Cassia Spohn et al., The
Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1987).
151. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION (1989);
Kathryn Roe Eldridge, Racial Disparitiesin the Capital System: Invidious or Accidental?, 14
CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2002); Larry Michael Fehr, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Prosecution
and Sentencing: Empirical Research of the Washington State Minority and Justice Commission, 32 GONz. L. REV. 577 (1996-97); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285 (2001);
Charles Ogletree, The Significance of Race in Federal Sentencing, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP.
229 (1994).
152. See Paul Butler, Starr is to Clinton as Regular ProsecutorsAre to Blacks, 40 B.C. L.
REv. 705 (1999); P.S. Kane, Why Have You Singled Me Out? The Use of ProsecutorialDiscretion for Selective Prosecution,67 TUL. L. REV. 2293 (1993); Romero, supra note 109.
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Scholarship documenting these repercussions and searching out
remedies demonstrates that race consciousness, and the offshoots of
affirmative action and multiculturalism, are not the sole preserve of
critical race scholars) 5 Stitched in race-neutral color, they are already
embroidered in the liberal text of ethics rules governing the adversary
system.
To their credit, ethics rules prohibit bias in prosecutor charging,
discovery, pretrial jury selection, trial practice, and more. Guided by
adversarial norms, the rules emphasize procedural justice and evidentiary fairness. The ABA Standards, for example, bar intentional
misrepresentation, bad faith, knowing offers of false or inadmissible
evidence, and misstatements of evidence. As previously mentioned,
they also regulate extra-judicial public statements calculated to cause
prejudice. More profoundly, they ban invidious racial discrimination
in mounting an investigation or prosecution.'55
The ban on invidious discrimination enmeshes prosecutors in
debate beyond the choice of allocating intrinsic and extrinsic sources
of discretion. Without diminishing the importance of that debate to
prosecutorial decisions at indictment or at voir dire, sorting out the
right balance of discretionary sources is unlikely to resolve the
parameters of a race-conscious duty in cases of white-on-black racial
violence. Compelled by the facts of violence but pinioned between the
ideals of colorblind constitutionalism and the practical efficacy of
color-coded stereotypes, prosecutors may be tempted to opt for covert
resolution..Put simply, they may resort to a clandestine style of raceconscious decisionmaking behind a veneer of race-neutral rhetoric, a
style evident only in its de facto consequences.
Clothed in the adversarial tradition, this pretextual style of raceneutral prosecution actually may serve the key interests of victims and
communities of color in race cases. Refashioning antebellum and
postbellum codes of color into retributive claims, it might deliver individualized justice to black victims and kindle the collective healing of
black communities. Concurrently, it might exact justice from white
offenders and thereby invite the partial redemption of white commu-

153. See Dorothy E. Roberts, CriminalJustice and Black Families: The CollateralDamage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L, REV. 1005 (2001).

154. Compare Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial
Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864 (1990), and Ilhyung
Lee, Race Consciousnessand Minority Scholars, 33 CONN. L. REV. 535 (2001), with Samuel
Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669 (1998), and Nancy
S. Marder, Juries,Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659 (2002), and Reginald
Leamon Robinson, The Shifting Race-Consciousness Matrix and the Multiracial Category
Movement, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (2000), and Darina Roithmayr, Direct Measures:
An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2001).
155. See AMER. BAR ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.1, 3-5.8
(1993).
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nities. In such ways, it might mediate the prosecutorial tension of
competing commitments to privately incurred punishment and
publicly displayed justice. Finally, it might fulfill the obligation of
liberal community to tolerate a continuing partition among still
divided and often implacable racial groups.
On any yardstick, these are substantial accomplishments. Whatever the pretext, to meet even partially the interests of victim and
offender communities and to carry out the purposes of private and
public justice are formidable achievements. They gain added luster by
satisfying the goals of liberalism and the imperatives of legality.
Although not enhanced by the pretense of race-neutrality, surely the
value of legality is not lessened by its presence. Similarly, the value of
liberalism is not diluted by the inauthenticity of racial pretense, particularly when, as here, it fosters consequentialist goals. What may be
diminished are the value of open procedure and the virtue of juridical
candor. Redemption depends in substantial measure on the values of
process and candor.
Race-conscious discretion borrows impoverished norms of process
and candor from the standard conception of discretion. Importing
these norms replicates the complications of private retribution and
public redemption that irk the standard conception. Even with the
embellishments of legality and justice, those complications may be
insoluble. Race-conscious discretion merely extends the tenets of
liberal legalism; it does not cure or displace them. Sympathetically
extended, standard discretion may be pressed into closer alliance with
the goals of interracial community and citizenship. That alliance
requires the recognition of racial status and the elevation of process
and candor in prosecuting race cases.
Inscribed in sociolegal identity and narrative, racial status is
obscured in the colorblind and color-coded prosecution of race cases.
Colorblind prosecution avoids the inscription of status out of formalist
conviction. Avoidance shuns status distinctions as irrelevant to the
advocacy process. That process is relatively open and candid. But it
may frustrate the goals of race case prosecutions. Color-coded prosecution, on the other hand, evades confession of the inscription of racial
status for instrumental purposes. Evasion of this sort covertly
preserves status distinctions as relevant to the advocacy process but
denies, or publicly withholds, its endorsement of such distinctions and
their tactical relevance for fear of inviting claims of prejudice. This
process is oblique and dissembling. Nonetheless, it may better advance
the goals of race prosecutions.
Discarding the neutral claims of standard discretion under colorblind and color-coded prosecutions unseals the advocacy process in
race cases exposing its race-conscious purposes. Candid disclosure of
those purposes is a virtue unacknowledged by standard discretion.
Disclosure is a virtue because it brings honesty to the public debate
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over racial injustice, and because it furthers the public policy of racial
reparation for individual victims of violence and of redemption for
communities inured to violence, white and black.
The virtue of candor in embracing racial status and in designing a
race-conscious process of advocacy links the prosecution function to
citizenship. This linkage wrests the meaning of black citizenship from
the stigma of antebellum and postbellum characterizations. Wresting
meaning from the stigmatizing portraits of black victims and their
accompanying communities revives a dialogic process in law, culture,
and society. Revival stirs cross-racial economic exchange, social
interaction, and political participation. These moments of community
dialogue and joinder intimate the possibility of reconciliation.
At the same time, the linkage rescues white citizenship from its
collective acceptance of antebellum and postbellum racial indignity
and inequality. Rescuing white citizenship from its own acquiescence
in such inequities allows for a kind of collective redemption. White
redemption is grounded in the sorrow of remorse. Unlike black
redemption and its locus of retribution, white redemption seeks to
repair and to reconcile relations of historical violence. That allowance
arrives from the candid prosecutorial decision to present the advocacy
process openly as a means to restore the dignity of black victims and
to redeem the conscience of white offenders, their communities, and
the state. 156 Restoration includes black retribution and forgiveness.
Redemption includes white punishment and penitence. Retributive
punishment and mercy are integral to the reciprocal morality of
citizenship. Reciprocity honors the norms of dignity and mutual respect. It forges sympathetic attachments across racial lines.
The candid process orientation of race-conscious discretion
burdens the already strained prosecutorial role of state partisan and
public minister. As a partisan of the state, the prosecutor strives to
enforce the law by preventing, deterring, and punishing wrongdoing.
As a minister of justice, he seeks to find the right result in balancing
the interests of the accused, the victim, and the public. This role competition occurs along a shifting boundary line. That line is affixed to
color. It dictates the freedom and constraint to engage in colorblind,
color-coded, and color-conscious advocacy. To be effective, the

156. Symbolically and normatively, candor exposes criminal reprosecutions as a category of race trials, rather than the more blunt category of political trials. See David Garland,
Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal Justice, in 11 STUDIES IN
LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 191 (Austin Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1991); Joseph E.
Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000). Compare DANIEL W. SHUMAN & ALEXANDER MCCALL
SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION OF OLD CRIMES: BALANCING LEGAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MORAL CONCERNS (2000), with AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 159-

77 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1994).
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boundaries of freedom and constraint must be reasonably determinate. In race cases, the boundary lines are frustratingly indeterminate.
Prosecutors experience the indeterminacy of color in assembling
the goals and claims of race cases. Based on victim, offender, and
community interests, those goals and claims may be asserted under
colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious standards of discretion.
The standards shape the character of identity and the content of narrative heard in advocacy. Identity and narrative are highly contingent on
fact and law. The complex accumulation of facts and the aggregation
of multiple legal theories and authorities in race cases heightens this
sense of indeterminacy. In the racial spiral of retrospectively collected
factual claims and statutorily culled legal claims, the lines separating
colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious advocacy blur.
The indeterminacy of fact produced in unearthing long-buried evidence 57 and in amassing legal materials gives race cases an unbounded
quality where zealous advocacy seems to proceed unrestricted. That
unbounded sense is intensified by the brutality of the underlying crime
and the intervening passage of time. Unlike antecedent crimes and
periods of racial violence, the reprosecution of race cases gives rise to
an epochal sense of historic combat and enduring legacy. Gripped by
this sensibility, prosecutors struggle to balance their duties to law
enforcement and public justice. Instead of finding equipoise, they
collapse the duties into a single compelling partisan obligation to
avenge violence by any colored means necessary.
The coloring of partisanship into racially coded advocacy is
restrained by the intrinsic and extrinsic sources of standard discretion.
That restraint is partial. Given the compulsion of zealous advocacy,
neither the factors of legality and justice, nor the variables of ethics
rules, constitutional values, and community norms, supplies adequate
controls. Insofar as each set of considerations draws on a lawyer's
practical judgment in the interpretation of legal rules, the purpose of
the rules may itself provide mitigating restraint. Both criminal and
civil rights laws harbor compelling public purposes.
The reprosecution of race cases entails the application of lawyer
judgment in interpreting the purposes of criminal and civil rights laws.
Applying legal rules signals lawyer independence. Discretion is a
function of that independence. The race-conscious exercise of lawyer
discretion seeks to integrate the interests of the victim, offender, and
public into the normative framework of criminal and civil rights law.
That framework contains punitive and redemptive purposes rooted in
penitence, reparation, and even restoration. Integration strives to
157. See Marion Manuel, Church Bombing Case Turns on Old Evidence, ATLANTA J.CONST., May 1, 2001, at A5; Jean Marbella, Sins of Past Still Cry Outfor Justice Conscience:
Witnesses are Breaking Years of Silence and Calling Aging Men to Answer for Crimes of the
1960s, BALT. SUN, May 20,2001, at C1.
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unify the interests of the accused, the victim, and the public in
punishing white defendants and in redeeming white communities.
Absent black and white community reconciliation, redemption will be
subverted and the overarching
purposes of criminal and civil rights
58
laws will be nullified.
The pursuit of black-white reconciliation motivates the raceconscious model of purposive lawyering. This independent-minded
practice model departs from an adversarial framework. Yet, like its
predecessor, that purposive framework relies on ethics rules and
standards for regulation. The colorblind instincts and color-coded tendencies of conventional ethics rules undermine the candor demanded
of race-conscious discretion. Accommodating candid midlevel procedures in reprosecutions that account for racial status, -multiple
party interests, and competing private and public needs requires
independent judgment reached in collaboration with black and white
communities. Cross-cutting collaboration is the springboard for community-guided ethical discretion in race cases. The next Part considers
the basis for community-guided restorative discretion.
V.

COMMUNITY-GUIDED RESTORATIVE DISCRETION

The idea of community-guided restorative discretion furnishes an
additional justification for the resurgent prosecution of white-on-black
racial violence. Restorative discretion modifies standard prosecutorial
discretion by loosening adversarial norms and intermixing raceconscious community norms. Modification leaves intact the intrinsic
sources of legality and justice as well as the extrinsic sources of ethics,
constitutional values, and community norms.
Restoratively gleaned, intrinsic and extrinsic sources of discretion
channel prosecutors toward interracial reconciliation. Under the standard conception of discretion, the intrinsic value of legality creates
powerful law enforcement imperatives. Rather than weaken those
imperatives, race-conscious discretion expands the framework of
legality to encompass the public purposes of relevant criminal and civil
rights laws.
Restorative discretion further enlarges that framework to take
account of both victim and community reparations. 59 In race cases,
158. For useful discussions of indeterminacy and independence in lawyering, see Robert
W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988), and David B. Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992). See also Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, supra note 127, at 2654-60,
159. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION (2001); Anthony E.
Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense of Black Reparations,
68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959 (2000); Alfred L. Brophy, Losing the [Understanding the Im-

portance of] Race: Evaluating the Significance of Race and the Utility of Reparations, 80
TEXAS L. REV. 911 (2002) (reviewing JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF
SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA (2000)).
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reparations refer to both spiritual and material recompense. The
reparations may come from the offender in the form of atonement and
restitution, from white communities in the form of public penitence, or
from the state in the form of contrition and compensation for mental,
physical, and economic harm."6 Of greater symbolic than monetary
value, the offering of apology may contribute to racial conciliation. 6
Similarly instilled within standard discretion, the intrinsic value of
justice commands potent retributive claims. Incited by vengeance, the
claims implicitly boast the vigor of prevention and deterrence. Taken
seriously, this boast suggests that the severity of vengeance works not
only to prevent (by death), but also to deter (by fear) crimes of racial
violence. Race-conscious discretion applauds such instrumental
averments. Explicit in remedial purpose, it seeks to halt racial violence.
Restorative discretion views the plaudits of vengeance with more
reservation. In spite of its asserted efficacy, vengeance wreaks
profound damage on community. For some communities of color, the
damage may prove irreparable. The joint failure of white communities
and the state to enjoin or remedy that damage weighs heavily on
conciliation, diminishing the likelihood of black forgiveness. The deterioration of forgiveness renders mercy for white offenders and their
communities improbable. The decline of mercy in turn may discourage
acts of atonement. Absent atonement, redemption ceases.
The debilitation of intrinsic sources of discretion under the standard conception of prosecution also saps extrinsic sources. Ethics
rules, for instance, blinded by the pretense of neutrality, stumble in
regulating the color-coded practices that permeate the criminal-justice
system. Race-conscious discretion cures this blindness only to
substitute a different sort of myopia. That is the myopia induced by
the unstable boundaries of color in advocacy.
Even for clear-eyed prosecutors, the lines segmenting colorblind,
color-coded, and color-conscious claims of advocacy fluctuate and
regularly fade from view. Restorative discretion accepts this fluctuation as part of the instability of race and the mutability of racial
identity. It appreciates that the facts of racial violence and the laws
delineating its prosecution are vulnerable to multifaceted readings
that may veer interpretatively from colorblind to color-coded and
back. It also recognizes that these distinctions are contextual, surfacing
in the everyday practice of advocacy and adjudication.

160. See Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway, Restitution Program Models with Adult Offenders, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION 165 (Burt Galaway & Joe
Hudson eds., 1990).

161. On the use and subversion of apology, see Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The
Commodificationof Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000), and Deborah L. Levi, Note, The
Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV, 1165 (1997).
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Densely layered within criminal-justice roles, relations, and institutions, distinctions of color frequently resist easy discernment. Prosecu-

torial roles in courtroom advocacy and neighborhood outreach nimbly
combine colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious approaches, for

example in jury selection and "qualify-of-life" policing. 62 Prosecutorial relations with offenders, criminal defense lawyers, and judges
mingle the same approaches in street-level profiling and disqualification motions." 3 Prosecutorial institution-wide policies also blend these
approaches in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing."6 Sometimes
interchangeable, the approaches succumb to conscious and unconscious bias.
The insinuations of bias are entrenched in the materials of law and
the tactics of advocacy. Colorblind claims may appear facially neutral
and laudable, yet they may shelter animus. Without refuge from
invidious intent, such claims engender racially disparate consequences
in law enforcement. Color-coded claims may seem correspondingly
neutral, yet they too elicit suspiciously disparate effects. 65 Even when

prosecutors dispense with the veneer of impartiality in favor of a
color-conscious approach, their claims may produce disparate
outcomes, especially where race intersects gender, ethnicity, or
sexuality. Despite these intricacies and contradictions, restorative discretion trusts the practical discernment of colored boundaries to the
good faith of prosecutorial judgment, checked by community-guided

intrinsic and extrinsic sources of restraint.

66

Extrinsic sources of community-guided discretion flow from the
constitutional values of dignity and equality. Aimed at offender162. Compare GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996), with
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING (2001), and Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social
Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999).
163. See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race,
and Disorderin New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000); F. Michael Higginbotham, In Memoriam: A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. - A Man for All Seasons, 16 HARV.
BLACKLET'rER L.J. 7, 11 (2000); Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched
by Experience, Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201
(1992). For discussion of race-based recusal and disqualification motions, see Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1975), and Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union
of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
164. On prosecutorial coloring in charging, plea bargaining, trial, and sentencing, see
LOU FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA KU KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 18711872 (1996); Anne Bowen Poulin, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing ProtectionAfter United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071 (1997), and
Lu-in Wang, UnwarrantedAssumption in the Prosecution and Defense of Hate Crimes, 17
CRIM. JUST. 4 (2002).
165. On the appearance of prejudice, see Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The
Logic of American AntidiscriminationLaw, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000).
166. See Alfieri, Community Prosecutors,supra note 10, at 1480-91, 1502-07.
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specific retribution and unmindful of victim well-being, standard
discretion discounts the value of dignitary and equality interests.
Constitutional norms elevate dignity in safekeeping individual
integrity and collective liberty from state onslaught or neglect.
Moreover, they enhance equality in securing the evenhanded protection of communities. In race cases, those interests unite black victims
and their communities.
Dignity applies equally in life and death. It is the root indignity of
white superiority and black inferiority that instigates white-on-black
violence. The act of white violence compounds that indignity. The
failure to prosecute white violence, and to eradicate its societal underpinnings, magnifies indignity and ensures its continuation.
Equality also pertains to life and death. It is the inequality of the
white-black hierarchy in economic and social relationships that
permits a culture of white-on-black violence to flourish. Repeated acts
of white violence reinforce black subordinate positions in that
hierarchy. The historic failure to punish white violence, and alter the
asymmetrical relationships of socioeconomic status, preserves
inequality in society and guarantees a powerless black position in
politics.
Race-conscious discretion honors victim dignitary and equality
values. Highlighting the plight of black victims and the menace to
black communities, it attacks white violence for lawbreaking and for
denigrating individual and collective dignity. It focuses that attack on
racial status, adducing evidence of status-based motive in offender
conduct and summoning statutory sanction under criminal and civil
rights law. Strengthened by a penalty-enhancement proviso, that
summons increasingly calls on hate crime legislation for remedy.
Although hate crime legislation captures the thrust of racial violence,
it mislays emphasis on retaliation. Reprisal cedes slim ground for
redemption.
Restorative discretion mitigates the retaliatory force of raceconscious hate crime prosecution. Endeavoring to repair dignity and
equality through conciliation, it petitions for offender atonement,
victim forgiveness, and state mercy. Contraposed to the punitive
appeal of standard and race-conscious discretion, the petition declares
the redeemability of white lawbreakers and the possibility of racial reform even when personal history and practical reason tilt to the contrary. That declaration complicates the relationship of punishment to
redemption.
Nothing in the formal definition of redemption precludes punishment. In fact, its predicate acts - atonement, contrition, penitence imply punishment of a robust size. The acts signal an acknowledgement of wrongdoing. This admission, coupled with promises of
physical rehabilitation and spiritual reformation, hardly amounts to
punishment. For redemption to be credible, some deprivation of
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proportionate duration and severity must ensue. Pressed too far in
severity, punishment may undermine the chance of white contrition. 67
In the same way, violence pushed too far in its brutality may undercut
the prospect of black forgiveness. Cruelty in either respect runs afoul
of redemption.
To survive incidents of private violence and public punishment,
restorative discretion must establish a benchmark for the reinstallation
of dignity and equality. The preference for reinstallation over restoration stems from the difficulty of recollecting black dignity and equality
in American law and society. Recollections gathered from antebellum,
postbellum, and Jim Crow eras find dignity battered and equality
destitute. Neither finding is fatal to redemption.
Dignity inhabits manifold public and private spheres. The spheres
are cross-cut by cleavages of race. The cleavages divide public space
into black and white redoubts. Within these strongholds, black

communities realize their own sense of dignity inlayed by culture and
social history." Outside of these strongholds, where public space
overlaps black and white geography in culture, economics, and
politics, black communities suffer the indignities of inferiority,
subordination, and violence. 69 Inexorably, the battering of black dignity in a white-dominated public space will disturb the experience of
black dignity in alternative public and private spaces.

To disturb dignity is not to extinguish it. The civil rights movement
demonstrates that dignity can endure public violence and private
humiliation. 7 ' The early history of the movement in particular shows
that dignity can overcome even unbridled violence.' Triumphing over
violence unsuccessfully resolves the tension spawned by differential
assessments of dignitary values by victims and communities of color,
167. Punishment may influence demonstrations of remorse. See Theodore Eisenberg et
al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1599 (1998); Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis
of Popular Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 168-90 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Michael
A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (2003); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial
Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998).
168. See Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (2000).
169. See Regina Austin, "An Honest Living": Street Vendors, Municipal Regulation, and
the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119 (1994); Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves":
Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147;
Regina Austin, "Not Justfor the Fun of It!": Governmental Restraintson Black Leisure, Social Inequality, and the Privatizationof Public Space, 71 S.CAL. L. REV. 667 (1998); Debra
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities,
and the New Policing,97 COLUM. L.REV. 551 (1997).
170. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954-63 (1988); TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65
(1998).
171. See JOHN EGERTON, SPEAK Now AGAINST THE DAY: THE GENERATION BEFORE
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH (1994).
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the public, and the state. That tension is inescapable given the rich
diversity of color, the separatist fervor of the public, and the segregationist legacy of the state. The failure to organize some union among

these variable assessments limits the redemptive guidance of constitutional values.
Comparable limits impinge on the constitutional value of equality
in restorative discretion. Like the attempt to recapture black dignity,
the effort to restore black equality collides with the recollections of
hardship mined from the antebellum, postbellum, and Jim Crow eras.
Those recollections provide a benchmark for equality notched by
poverty and stratification. That benchmark is anathema to restorative
discretion. The handiwork of post-Reconstruction tools for demeaning
socioeconomic status, the benchmark recalls a time of malignant
inequality that continues in many sectors of the black community." 3
To obtain a more satisfactory principle of equality in guiding race
cases, prosecutors must turn again to the civil rights movement, particularly to antidiscrimination laws.'74 Unlike the more controversial
claim of preferential treatment, 5 the turn to civil rights and its
memory of struggle'7 6 points to the inadequacy of the colorblind
approach in alleviating inequality in the criminal-justice system.'77 For

race cases, only a forward-looking race-conscious approach to prosecution intent upon ameliorating the socioeconomic position of black
communities will satisfy the goal of restorative justice. Amelioration
comes in uplifting the legal, socioeconomic, and political status of

communities, not simply in a flurry of apologies or an award of reparations.
172. See Anita Christina Butera, Assimilation, Pluralism and Multiculturalism: The Policy of Racial/EthnicIdentity in America, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2001); Patrick F.
Linehan, Thinking Outside of the Box: The Multiracial Category and Its Implications for
Race Identity Development, 44 HOW. LJ. 43 (2000).
173. See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL (1992); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).

174. See Tanya Katerf Hernandez, MultiracialMatrix: The Role of Race Ideology in the
Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws: A United States-Latin America Comparison, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2002); Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality,
and AntidiscriminationLaw, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194 (2000).
175. See Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential"Treatment, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 943 (2002).
176. See Katherine M. Franke, The Uses of History in Struggles for RacialJustice: Colonizing the Pastand Managing Memory, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1673 (2000); Bill Maurer, Visions
of Fact; Languages of Evidence: History, Memory, and the Trauma of Legal Research, 26
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 893 (2001) (reviewing HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999)).
177. Colorblind axioms also flounder in combating race discrimination outside the
black-white paradigm. See Liann Ebesugawa, State v. Rogan: Racial Discrimination and
Limits of the Color-Blind Approach, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 821 (2002); David H. Getches,
Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuitof States' Rights, Color-BlindJustice and
Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001).
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Uplifting the racial status ,of victims and communities of color
slows the dilution of extrinsic sources of discretion under the standard
colorblind approach to race case prosecutions. Community norms
maintain a weak presence in the exercise of standard discretion.
Displaced by adversarial rituals, the norms are shunted aside in the
individualized hunt for criminal convictions. t Both offender and
victim communities are shunned in this hunt, their participation
stunted, and their voices silenced.179
Race-conscious discretion reincorporates community into the
prosecution process. Implanting the offender and victim in community, it searches white and black constituents for signs of color
consciousness. It is color that connects the private acts of criminal
lawbreaking to a public constellation of actors. For white offenders,
color connects up to communities founded on racial superiority. For
black victims, color attaches to communities trapped by racial inferiority. Release from these parallel entrapments requires the blunt,
race-conscious assignment of collective responsibility to white communities tolerant of racial violence and to states complicit in such acquiescence, an acquiescence that signals the collapse of public/private
boundaries recognized by postbellum constitutional and statutory
jurisprudence enacted by Congress during Reconstruction."8 It also
demands race-conscious sensitivity to the insidious devaluation of
black communities as cultural and economic resources.

178. On the integration of community norms in criminal and civil rights law, see PENDA
D. HAIR, ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAWYERS, COMMUNITIES
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 151-55 (2001) (urging incorporation of race into a community framework of justice). See also John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional
Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersectionof Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1927 (1999); Steven F. Lawson, Freedom Then, Freedom Now: The Historiography
of the Civil Rights Movement, 96 AM. HIST. REV. 456 (1991); Christian Sundquist, Critical
Praxis,Spirit Healing, and Community Activism: Preservinga Subversive Dialogue on Reparations, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 659 (2003). Compare Richard Delgado, Prosecuting
Violence: A Colloquy on Race, Community, and Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV, 751 (2000), with
ROBERT WEISBERG, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE DANGERS OF COMMUNITY (Stanford

Law School, Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 50, Feb. 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
179. The unreflective defense of criminal offenders independent of third-party interests
contributes to this silence. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80
TEXAS L. REV. 1383 (2002); Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated
Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925 (2000). The
same silence attends the neglect of role and racial identity. Compare ARTHUR ISAK
APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND

PROFESSIONAL LIFE 61-75 (1999), with David B. Wilkins, Beyond "Bleached out" Professionalism: Defining Professional Responsibility for Real Professionals, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 207-34 (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 2000).
180. On the constitutional and statutory bases of prosecuting bias crimes, see
FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 11060(1999).
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Standing alone, neither race-conscious responsibility nor raceconscious evaluation will achieve restorative results. To achieve
restorative justice, white communities must accept responsibility for
violence and contrition. Inversely, black communities must shoulder
the obligation of forgiveness. Redemptive responsibility is not easily
seized or imposed. It is a process shaken by internal quarrel over the
criminal-justice goals and claims of prosecution in race cases.
Internal quarrels over prosecution goals and claims upset communities and state agents. Broadening prosecutorial goals from punishment to mercy incites disagreement within black communities. Shifting
claims from culpability to contrition inflames the resentments of white
communities. Adding to this internal discord is the external friction
generated by prosecutor-community and prosecutor-state conflict.
Offender and victim communities may clash with prosecutor-slated
goals and claims. Federal, state, and local agents may also spar over
the ranking of prosecutor goals and claims.
Restorative discretion concedes a broad spectrum of conflicts
dividing communities and the state. It anticipates both internal dissension voiced within communities and external dissent announced within
the state forums of administrative agencies, courts, and legislatures.
Unsure of the exact permutations of dissension, it insists that the
resolution of these conflicts occur in a grassroots collaborative
context, rather than by paternalistic decree. The key to resolution is
the renunciation of colorblind prosecution.
Community-guided restorative discretion is color-conscious. Rejecting the pretense of neutrality as false and unproductive, it substitutes candor in addressing the histories of racial violence and in settling the differences of racial community. Candor introduces an open
process of prosecutorial decisionmaking. That process is republican: it
calls for civic participation and public deliberation in setting the goals
and claims of race case prosecutions. It demands the development of
midlevel procedures that are responsive to racial status, multiple party
and nonparty interests, and competing private and public needs. And
it relies on independent practical judgment and community collaboration.
The institutional development of midlevel procedures to guide
prosecutorial discretion builds from the groundwork of restorative
justice.' Out of that groundwork come claims of atonement and

181. See DENNIS SULLIVAN & LARRY TIFFT, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HEALING THE
FOUNDATIONS OF OUR EVERYDAY LIVES (2001); David H. Bayley, Security and Justice for
All, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 211 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite
eds., 2001); John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1999); Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution:A Restorative Justice
Critique of Anti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST, L.Q. 717 (2000);
Glenn M. Kaas, Restorative Justice: A New Paradigm for the Prosecutor, PROSECUTOR,
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mercy.'82 Those claims challenge conventional theories of punish-

ment'83 and deterrence,'1 giving rise to an exploration of alternative
sanctions.' 5 Steering a path between vengeance and forgiveness, I' 6 the
exploration leads to an evolving reconceptualization of racial violence
as a hybrid form of legal-political crime. Conceived as such, race cases
afford the opportunity to consider alternative prosecutorial strategies
borrowed from restorative and transitional justice experi-

ments abroad, for example in South Africa under the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission"8 and in East Germany.'" Those alterna-

tive strategies of racial reconciliation rest heavily on narrative. 89

Nov./Dec. 2000, at 31; Clifford Shearing, Transforming Security: A South African Experiment, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra, at 14.
182. See Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999);
David M. Lerman, Forgivenessin the CriminalJustice System: If It Belongs, then Why Is It So
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The narratives of restorative discretion break from the lexicon of
retributive punishment in prosecuting race cases. They depart in
search of redemption and reconciliation. The language of redemption
speaks of contrition and atonement. The language of reconciliation
talks of forgiveness and mercy. Both invoke the rhetoric of community
on behalf of the offender, victim, public, and state. Borne of violence,
that rhetoric may ring empty. Enlarging its meaning outside of the
adversary tradition requires translation.
Prosecutorial translation of the retributive tradition into a restorative approach to criminal justice for offenders, victims, and their
adjoining communities depends on narrative. Restorative narratives
strive for empathy. Locating offender and victim stories in the racialized histories of segregated communities, they seek to promote
empathic understanding in lay public and private forums, and among
legal and political decisionmakers. Understanding differs from
enlightenment. It arises from hearing stories of racial violence in
common places: churches, schools, and public squares. Hearing stories
provides the basis for cross-racial learning and dialogue in the
innumerable venues of law, culture, and society. For public agents and
private citizens, dialogue across racial lines contributes to an informed
and empathic decisionmaking process in criminal justice and civic governance.
The adversarial practices of the criminal-justice system shackle the
open search for information documenting racial violence and obstruct
the dialogue essential for the redemptive resolution of race cases. The
task of restorative discretion is to unfetter that search and to stimulate
dialogue. The goal is to initiate and, if possible, sustain a
multigenerational conversation between black and white communities
about their mutual interests in redemptive justice.
Numerous obstacles jeopardize that conversation. Narratives are
typically disjointed and contradictory. Stories are often incomplete
and misleading. Dialogue is fragile and ephemeral. And empathy is
vulnerable to the cognitive staining of color. But none of these deficits
is more devastating than internal community strife. Internal divisiveness over the goals and claims of race prosecutions compromises the
ability to repair black communities and redeem white communities.
To surmount these obstacles, prosecutors must engage offender
and victim communities and their subgroups in a discussion about the
shared benefits of reparation and redemption. Law offers no universal
narrative or story capable of conveying those benefits. Because the
benefits accrue differently to black and white communities, and
splinter further within multicultural communities, colorblind discourse
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United States Through PersonalStories, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 195 (2000).
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fares badly."9 Instead of race-neutral or binary accounts of sociolegal
benefit, prosecutors must draw upon the communities' diverse identity
resources, finding common ground in social difference and historical
alliance in law. 19'
By celebrating difference and its defense under criminal and civil
rights law, prosecutors may be able to overcome status distinctions
between and among racial communities. Those distinctions are
enmeshed in symbolic and narrative descriptions of racial superiority
and inferiority. The descriptions objectify and, thereby, deform
offenders and victims. Interwoven in law and society, the process of
objectification in contemporary race prosecutions too often reduces
white offenders to objects of segregationist zealotry and black victims
to feeble objects of pity. Neither punishment nor acquittal will arrest
this reductionist tendency. Moreover, neither result will save its
objects and their extended communities from harm.
In race cases, harm is experienced on individual and collective
planes. For black victims and their communities, harm stigmatizes
racial status. Black stigma is signified by powerlessness. Standard
discretion attributes victimization to powerlessness, accenting its
irremediable condition. It conjures images of historical vulnerability
and passive resistance. Part of the purpose of race-conscious restorative discretion is to show that black victims actively resisted violence
and that the intervening years of state inaction cloaked constant grassroots struggle. 92 Juridically restoring the historical power to resist
individually and to struggle collectively against violence redeems the
status of black communities in American law and society. That
restoration of power enables those communities to demand punishment and yet pronounce mercy. The forgiveness underlying mercy
redeems black communities in spirit and civic culture. For white
offenders and their communities, mercy offers the reciprocal opportunity for atonement and redemption.
Race case prosecutors redeem black power in opposition to, and in
conciliation with, the forces of white violence in northern and
southern states. Redeeming the oppositional stance of black communities to white violence corrects misapprehensions of racialized roles in
the historical record. Those misapprehensions led to the demeaning of
190. See Melissa Cole, The Color-Blind Constitution, Civil Rights-Talk, and a Multicultural Discourse for a Post-Reparations World, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 127
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L. REV. 223 (2002)..
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black character and community in lawtand society. Restorative discretion affirms the dignity of black character and the centrality of black
community to the pursuit of equality. Redeeming the conciliatory
stance of black communities to white communities that harbor fugitive
zealots renews the spirituality of the civil rights movement. 193 Renewal
slackens the adversarial pull of retributive punishment, offering the
prospect of mercy, forgiveness, and reconciliation.' 94
Prosecutorial-urged reconciliation in race cases is a practical
enterprise. It occurs in the painful context of brutal fact and failed law.
Its success is less contingent on case selection and strategy than on the
capacity to bring candid, race-conscious perspectives to the prosecution of long-standing incidents of white-on-black violence. Tailored to
the changing identity of offenders and victims, those perspectives look
for guidance in cross-racial conversations and collaborations.'
No
longer merely accountable to the state or unaccountable to the
morality of race,' 96 redemptive prosecutors engage the contested
judgments of interracial community.
CONCLUSION

Part of a larger project devoted to the study of race, lawyers, and
ethics within the criminal-justice system, this Essay set out to conduct
an investigation of the recently renewed prosecution of long dormant
criminal and civil rights cases of white-on-black racial violence. Both
descriptive and prescriptive in orientation, it tried to capture the
normative and sociolegal meaning of this now resurgent prosecution.
The purpose of securing that elusive meaning was to cast and recast
the parameters of the prosecutor's redemptive role in cases of racial
violence.
The Essay commenced its appraisal of prosecutorial norms and
practices in retrying cases of white-on-black violence with a brief
survey of race in relation to law and community, a review of race case
genealogy, and a summary of renewed prosecution efforts in criminal
and civil rights cases from the 1950s and 1960s. To discover a justification for retrying race cases, the Essay evaluated the standard conception of prosecutorial discretion, its intrinsic and extrinsic sources of
193. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990); Anthony E. Cook, The Spiritual Movement Towards Justice, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1007 (1993).
194. See Roy Reed, Dahmer Murder Enrages Whites; Reaction to Slaying Reflects a
Changing Hattiesburg, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1966, at 12; Roy Reed, Release of Klansman,
Jailedfor Killing Black Leader, Is Decried in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1972, at 17.
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content, and its staunch ties to the adversary system. Next it analyzed
the notion of race-conscious discretion and its adaptability as an alternative justification. Last it assessed the idea of community-guided
restorative discretion as a more compelling theory of justification. At
each turn, the Essay attempted to reweave prosecutorial ethics and
community norms in retrying cases of racial violence."
It is unlikely that weaving a redemptive role for prosecutors in
cases of racial violence and spinning out strands toward statesponsored restorative conciliation will soon reform the criminal-justice
system or reconstruct community. Nonetheless, they demonstrate the
potential importance of prosecutorial leadership in teaching parties,
nonparties, and the public about the different historical realities of
racial dignity and inequality in law and society. This race-conscious
pedagogy of prosecution may prove useful to legal education, law
It also may serve to
enforcement, and civil rights advocacy.'
reinvigorate hate crime and bias laws, and promote interracial justice.
For prosecutors entangled in the historical filaments of racial identity
and narrative, redemption may seem inapposite. The call of lawyer
shame and redemption, however, echoes throughout the American
legal history of race. 9 The echo of redemptive prosecution sounds the
highest calling.
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